CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
power (telecommunications data, stored content and live content). These regimes include requirements that must be met
before access is granted, limitations on access once granted, limitations of the use of material once accessed, destruction
requirements, internal and independent oversight regimes, and public reporting requirements.’89
The majority of countries (over 75 per cent), said that safeguards were build into primary
legislation. The remainder of countries reported that safeguards derived from secondary legislation,
executive decree, court decisions or law enforcement of prosecution policies.90 While safeguards
might legitimately derive from sources other than primary legislation, they must still – as discussed
below – be enshrined in ‘law’ that provides adequate and effective guarantees against abuse of the
investigative
measure itself.
Figure 5.12: Legal requirements for use of investigative measures
Countries
Expedited
were also asked
preservation of data
further detail about
Order for
Evidence/report of act
subscriber data
specific procedural
Seizure
safeguards. These
Evidence/report of
serious act
included the nature
Search
Probable cause/
of
legal
reasonable grounds
Order for traffic data
requirements to be
Risk of damage
Real‐time collection
met
before
a
traffic data
particular
Other
Order for content data
investigative
Real‐time collection
of content data
measure could be
used, as well as the
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87‐96. (n=51)
identity
of
authorizing authorities. With respect to procedural requirements, the majority of countries reported
that a large range of investigative measures could be initiated on the basis of ‘evidence or report of a
[cybercrime] act.’91 For measures with a higher degree of intrusiveness, such as real-time collection of
data, or collection of content data, countries more often required evidence or report of a ‘serious’
cybercrime, or procedural requirements such as demonstration of ‘probable cause’ or ‘reasonable grounds’
of suspicion of an
offence.92
Figure 5.13: Authorization of investigative measures
Expedited preservation of
data
Order for subscriber data
Authorization by law
enforcement
Seizure
Authorization by
prosecution
Search
Order for traffic data
Authorization by
courts
Real‐time collection traffic
data
Other
Order for content data
Real‐time collection of
content data
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Source: Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87‐96. (n=51)
89
90
91
92
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q100.
Ibid.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q87-96.
Ibid.
137
A similar pattern
was observed with respect
to the identity of the
authorizing authority for
different
investigative
measures.
Countries
frequently reported that
comparatively less intrusive
measures,
such
as
expedited preservation of
data, or orders for
subscriber data, could be
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents