ANNEXES
The IHL principle of distinction seeks
to ensure that only legitimate military
objects are attacked. Distinction has
two components. The first, relating
to personnel, seeks to maintain the
distinction between combatants and
non-combatants or military and civilian
personnel. The second component
distinguishes between legitimate military
targets and civilian objects.
All Australian military capabilities are
employed in line with approved targeting
procedures. Cyber activities are no
different. Australian targeting procedures
comply with the requirements of IHL
and trained legal officers provide
decision-makers with advice to ensure
that Australia satisfies its obligations
under international law and its domestic
legal requirements.
International human rights law
(IHRL) also applies to State conduct
in cyberspace. Under IHRL, States
have obligations to protect relevant
human rights of individuals under
their jurisdiction, including the right to
privacy, where those rights are exercised
or realised through or in cyberspace.
Subject to lawful derogations and
limitations, States must ensure without
distinction individuals’ rights to privacy,
freedom of expression and freedom of
association online.
3. General principles of international
law, including the law on State
responsibility
The customary international law on State
responsibility, much of which is reflected
in the International Law Commission’s
Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, applies
to State behaviour in cyberspace. Under
the law on State responsibility, there will
be an internationally wrongful act of a
State when its conduct in cyberspace
– whether by act or omission – is
attributable to it and constitutes a breach
of one of its international obligations.
To the extent that a State enjoys the
right to exercise sovereignty over
objects and activities within its territory,
it necessarily shoulders corresponding
responsibilities to ensure those objects
and activities are not used to harm other
States. In this context, we note it may not
be reasonable to expect (or even possible
for) a State to prevent all malicious use
of ICT infrastructure located within its
territory. However, in Australia’s view,
if a State is aware of an internationally
wrongful act originating from or routed
through its territory, and it has the ability
to put an end to the harmful activity, that
State should take reasonable steps to do
so consistent with international law.
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