1 Intelligence: Capability to act: while the vast majority of cyber attacks can be deterred by the IT or CERT department of the affected party, combating persistent covert cyber attacks by state actors (advanced persistent threats; APTs) also requires intelligence or counterintelligence investigations. Such investigations provide unique intelligence, enabling effective defensive measures to be taken. The DISS provides intelligence about threats in the cyber domain to relevant actors within and beyond Defence, such as DefCERT, the Public Prosecution Service, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the private sector, so that they can take measures on the basis of that intelligence. Technical properties of cyber attacks garnered by the DISS and the GISS can be registered in the National Detection Network (NDN) for the purpose of detecting cyber espionage and sabotage. The NDN is a collaborative for a better and faster detection of cyber threats to vital sectors and the national government, so that damage can be prevented or limited. The DISS’s contribution to the NDN will be extended. New defence assets will be deployed with which an active defence against cyber attacks can be developed. In addition, the number of sensors will be increased so that it is possible to detect and investigate cyber attacks more quickly and effectively and take action to counter the threat. As announced in the NCSA, in addition to participation in the NDN, the DISS will also participate in the collaboration platform with the NCSC, AIVD and the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), with a view to sharing relevant information, technical or otherwise, about cyber threats. Intelligence forms the foundation for military capability in the cyber domain. The availability of intelligence is the starting point for offensive cyber capabilities, and intelligence provided by the DISS enables the Defence Cyber Command to shape the military capability. Furthermore, under the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wiv), intelligence enables the DISS to take action itself to disrupt acute threats in the cyber domain. Attribution: the increasing cyber threat calls for a vigorous international response based on by international agreements. That response is not vigorous enough at present. It is the government’s intention to reprimand perpetrators of cyber attacks for their behaviour more often, in some cases publicly. First of all, this requires detection, followed by political and possible legal attribution. Establishing who the actor is behind a cyber operation (technical attribution) is a vital and complex stage of this process, and requires intensive investigations. In collaboration with partners such as the AIVD and the KLPD, the DISS carries out sophisticated knowledge-intensive intelligence investigations to uncover the actor behind the cyber attack and the actor’s intentions, so that the government can proceed with political attribution and take targeted countermeasures. An active political attribution policy contributes to the deterrence capability and to making the Netherlands a less attractive target for cyber attacks. A state actor that is reprimanded, publicly or otherwise, for its actions will think differently than an attacker that can operate in full anonymity. In this way, the Netherlands is helping to counter impunity in the cyber domain. Defence Cyber Strategy 7

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