Chapter 2 Retrospective | CSAN 2021
2 Retrospective
In the period from March 2020 to March 2021, numerous cyber incidents occurred in or in relation
to the Netherlands, with both intentional and unintentional causes. None of these incidents led
to social disruption. The impact of incidents varied widely, from a brief interruption of processes
to the need to rebuild parts of the technical infrastructure. Cyber incidents not only have an
impact on direct victims, but also on (chains of) suppliers, customers and members of the public
who use the services of (public) organisations. In public organisations, there is no choice of service
for members of the public, but rather a dependency relationship. In a number of incidents, the
interests of individual and sometimes vulnerable members of the public have been affected, such
as when personal data has been stolen. The following are recurring themes in an open source
summary of incidents: COVID-19 as an opportunity for malicious actors; targeting facilities for
remote working; deliberately denying access to processes; attacks on organisations in supply
chains; data breaches, and finally, process outages. The Retrospective chapter is structured
around these themes and provides concrete examples of incidents that have occurred.
2.1 COVID-19 an opportunity for malicious
actors
The global COVID-19 pandemic strongly influences the
Retrospective. The pandemic was and is being exploited by
malicious actors. For example, state actors have used digital
espionage activities in their search for information on medical
knowledge and policy follow-up on COVID-19. These include
research data on treatment, test results and vaccines, information
on the estimated spread of infection and possible policy strategies.
Criminals are exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic for attacks
through phishing, ransomware and distribution of malicious apps.
They are increasing the pressure to pay ransom by launching
ransomware attacks on the processes of organisations that are
crucial in the fight against COVID-19, including patient care
facilities, medical suppliers and laboratories. For example, the
Dutch healthcare sector was advised by Z-CERTII in close
cooperation with the NCSC following a ransomware attack on a
medical supplier. The need in society for information and financial
support under COVID-19 has been exploited frequently in phishing
campaigns as a stepping stone for attacks. These were often preexisting malware campaigns in which the theme of emails,
malicious attachments and links were adapted to COVID-19. In the
Netherlands, for example, SMS phishing (smishing) has been
observed, in which malicious parties pretend to be the National
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). According
to Z-CERT, the effect of the phishing campaigns in the Dutch
healthcare sector has been limited. Finally, the hacking of the
European Medicines Agency (EMA) in December 2020 showed that
both medical knowledge and information on policy monitoring
had been misused in a disinformation campaign.
II
Z-CERT has been designated as the computer emergency response team for the
entire healthcare sector (Network and Information Systems Security Act) since
January 2020.
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