Chapter 2 Retrospective | CSAN 2021
State actors actively scanning for vulnerable VPN
systems
State actors are actively seeking vulnerable VPN systems in
networks of both (semi-) public and private parties. Vulnerable
systems can also be used at a later time to launch a larger attack,
on the entire chain for example. The NCSC received reports from
various sectors about observed scanning activities and that some
organisations were vulnerable, but that no exploitation had taken
place. Foreign CERTs have also observed increased scanning
activity for VPN vulnerabilities in the period March 2020 to March
2021. The following VPN vulnerabilities, among others, have been
frequently exploited to gain access to a system: Pulse Connect
Secure (CVE-2019-11510), Fortigate SSL (CVE-2018-13379, CVE2018-13382 and CVE-2018-13383) and Citrix ADC
(CVE-2019-19781). Meanwhile, patches exist for these VPN
vulnerabilities and several warnings and control measures have
been published. Nevertheless, there are still organisations in the
Netherlands that use vulnerable VPN solutions. Organisations in
the SME sector in particular have not yet resolved the
vulnerabilities.
There is also a fourth (unofficial) category of remote working
facilities: shadow ICT; solutions that are not part of the approved
office applications, but which are used for work-related purposes.
Examples are messaging apps, private email and private cloud
applications. This category has also gained in importance because,
as a result of COVID-19, there was a need for workarounds to
quickly share information and documents. In November 2020, in a
report on safe working from home, the Court of Audit pointed out
the serious security risks that the use of shadow ICT can entail.
2.3 Deliberately denying access to
processes
There are many ways to deliberately deny access to processes. The
two most important are disruption with a DDoS attack and the use
of ransomware.
DDoS: bigger, heavier and longer lasting attacks
In the reporting period, digital processes of Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), the financial sector, education and public
organisations were affected by DDoS attacks. Notable was the trend
towards heavier and more complex attacks combining multiple
attack vectors. Exceptionally heavy DDoS attacks were carried out in
the month of August 2020 with peaks of up to 260 Gigabits per
second. The attacks mainly targeted the shared infrastructure at
ISPs. In a number of cases, not only customers experienced
disruptions in their online services, but also the providers
themselves. In its annual DDoS data report, the Dutch Internet
Providers Management Organisation states that DDoS attacks have
become more powerful and complex in 2020, while the number
and duration of DDoS attacks has also increased. Attackers are said
to have above-average skills. They target the underlying
infrastructure and the attackers often change misused protocols,
which makes defending difficult. Despite this, the Anti-DDoS
Coalition says that through cooperation, it has been able to limit
the consequences of the DDoS attacks in the Netherlands.
DDoS has traditionally been the tool of cyber vandals or individuals
who launch attacks out of frustration with the target organisation.
There is also the phenomenon of RDDoS (Ransom Distributed
Denial-of-Service): extortion using a DDoS attack as a means of
applying pressure. Worldwide warnings were issued about DDoS
extortion emails sent to financial institutions in various states,
including the Netherlands.
Several providers suffered DDoS attacks; but no major
disruptions
In August 2020, several Dutch providers experienced DDoS
attacks. Several providers were temporarily taken down as a result.
In the case of a provider from the province of Zeeland, the attack
meant that internet, TV and telephony were unavailable in large
parts of the province for some time. This also caused a regional PIN
malfunction.
Ransomware leads to inaccessible processes and
irreversible damage
During the reporting period, actors held key systems hostage with
ransomware attacks. As a result, digital processes of public
organisations, among others, (largely) came to a standstill and
irreversible damage was caused to ICT systems. The method used to
perpetrate ransomware attacks has changed significantly in recent
years. There has been a move towards Big Game Hunting,
compromising carefully selected organisations. These are usually
wealthy organisations, responsible for continuity of processes or in
possession of unique data. The pressure on the victim is greatly
increased by the ransomware being deployed at the most strategic
location in the network. In addition, the means of applying
pressure has also changed. Where initially data or systems were
encrypted, now data is also stolen and threatened to be made
public. This is why data breaches are regularly seen as significant
collateral damage in ransomware attacks. There are also examples
of actors who accompany a ransomware attack with a threat of a
DDoS attack as an additional means of applying pressure.
According to the FBI, telephone threats with physical visits to the
home are also occurring in ransomware attacks. The combination
of these strategies poses an increased risk to organisations where
many people depend on, where unique and high-quality
knowledge is generated and where responsibility for processing
19
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents