Chapter 4 Ransomware risk to national security | CSAN 2021
Figure 1: The ransomware kill chain
Obtaining
initial access
Consolidating
position
Siphoning-off
information
Diversification and specialisation can also be seen here. Each step
in this ransomware kill chain has specialists who either offer this as
a service or cooperate with other specialists to carry out highly
effective combined attacks.
Here, too, clear cost-benefit considerations apply. In a targeted
attack, factors considered in determining a ransom demand
include the effort required to penetrate and gain control of a
network, the risks to the attacker of being discovered, the capital
strength of the victim and the extent to which business continuity
and/or sensitive data play an important role for the victim.
Moreover, the higher the general willingness of victims to pay, the
higher the demands will be. The Police also note that an
appropriate portion of the ransom paid by victims is directly
invested in new attack infrastructures, and thus in attacking new
victims.
Ransomware-as-a-Service: a plague for SMEs
The majority of ransomware attacks are characterised as RaaS.
Ransomware developers found this to be a way to spread their
malware on a large scale without running any risks themselves.
RaaS offers the customers of this product the opportunity to apply
ransomware to networks or systems even without significant
programming skills. These customers, also known as affiliates, fall
into the dependent perpetrators category. For each successful
ransomware attack, they pay the ransomware developer a fixed,
agreed percentage of the ransom paid.
The victims of these mostly indiscriminate attacks are generally
small to medium-sized enterprises and increasingly public
institutions such as local authorities. These are victims with
generally low to limited digital resilience, where relatively little
time and effort needs to be invested by the attacker. In April 2020,
Help Net Security estimated, following a survey of more than 500
executives within international SMEs, that 46% of SMEs had, at
some time, been victims of ransomware.
Deployment of
ransomware
Financial
settlement
Big Game Hunting: customisation for maximum yield
These are targeted attacks on large organisations, whereby
customised attacks are carried out in order to achieve maximum
financial gain. It is mainly autonomous groups - often Eastern
European - that (are able to) carry out such attacks. Ransomware is
often 'just' a part of a process with several combined attack
techniques.
In this process, different groups, each with their own
specialisation, often work together, which significantly increases
the threat. The Emotet botnet, for example, which was taken down
by the Police and the Public Prosecution Service in 2021, infected
more than a million systems worldwide with attack methods that
were not very sophisticated. In many cases, computers were
infected with spam without being targeted. This was possible
because the investigation revealed that victims' often low level of
digital resilience could be exploited to the full. A striking example:
finding two-factor authentication on a system was already a reason
not to continue the attack. The next steps in the attack process
were often targeted and advanced. The group behind Emotet
manifested itself as a service provider by reselling access to
networks within a select customer base. Somewhere in this
process, a form of triage also took place, whereby the wealthiest
networks were ranked higher. The customers, in the sense of other
autonomous groups, could then install their additional malware or
have it installed. For example TrickBot, which was used to
consolidate the position and steal information. Ultimately, using
Ryuk ransomware, actors were able to target ransomware on these
networks at strategic locations, where they were able to make a
realistic assessment of what the maximum ransom demand could
be. The publication or threat of publishing the previously stolen
data could serve as an additional means of applying pressure.
Investigations reveal that such cooperation is becoming
increasingly complex. An attack on a network can therefore involve
different actors, who take on different roles, whereby the
distinction between perpetrating acts and providing services
becomes significantly blurred. Also, actors can choose different
malware families in different circumstances, in a plug-and-play
manner. This makes its detection, but also its mitigation,
particularly complex.
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