Chapter 6 Geopolitics influences threats and interests | CSAN 2021
6 Geopolitics influences
threats and interests
Domestic relations and relations between states determine the interests that states promote
and the objectives that they pursue. This creates a geopolitical force field that is in motion
and also makes itself felt in cyberspace. State actors use their instruments to promote their
interests there as well. And sometimes that promotion of interests poses a threat to the
national security interests of others, as evidenced by the Threat Assessment for State Actors
from the AIVD, MIVD and NCTV.
The threat is evolving
Motives of state actors vary
The threat posed by state actors is nothing new; it has been
developing for some time. Sometimes it becomes more vague,
sometimes more manifest. This is not only due to geopolitical
shifts, such as the emergence of new powers that question the
post-war international order or the renewed assertiveness of
established powers. The tools also change. This makes the threat
emanating from state actors towards Dutch society diverse and
complex. The increased digitisation and technological possibilities
increase the risks involved.
The motives of state actors for deploying resources in or against
other states vary. To a large extent, it is a matter of promoting
domestic political and security interests. Think of combating
dissidents living abroad. An important driving force here is the
desire to preserve the status quo in the country of origin: including
the existing state structure, role and position of the head of state
and role and position of the nationals (both at home and abroad).
Although activities related to this are not directly directed against
the Netherlands or our allies, they can certainly harm our interests.
Different states engage in a wide range of activities in pursuit of
their interests. They can use all means available to them within
their government's remit to do so. Their activities may affect our
national security. The threat comes both from state actors with a
different strategic agenda and from state actors with a different
political system to the Netherlands. The threat can manifest itself
directly or through proxies; this term refers to third parties used by
state actors. In recent years, concrete manifestations of threats
have been observed from various states. Influencing and
interference activities, espionage and information confrontation
are common practices. In information confrontation, the
information domain, including media, social media and platforms,
is seen as a battle arena and information is used as a weapon to
inflict harm. State actors also use economic instruments to achieve
geopolitical goals. Even activities that few state actors engage in,
such as preparations for and actual sabotage, can have potentially
serious consequences for national security.
Other motives are often financial and economic. Here, too, the
preservation of the status quo in the country of origin plays a major
role. The diaspora (people living outside the country of origin) is a
source of income, making investments (such as the purchase of
real estate) and providing financial support to family members left
behind. Notable examples are those states for which engaging in
illegal digital activities has become a revenue model. For example,
North Korea derives a significant proportion of its state revenue
from illegal digital activities such as ransomware attacks against
international companies and cyber theft. Economic espionage also
plays a large part, with which state actors aim to improve their own
competitive position, for example, or to acquire high-quality
knowledge and technology without having to incur the costs of
research and development themselves. Illustrative of this is
Chinese economic espionage, which primarily focuses on
technology theft and insider information on proposed
investments.
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