NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021
Espionage, sabotage and outages have already been extensively
discussed in the CSAN 2020. The risks associated with this (risks 1, 2
and 4) are still relevant. Espionage and sabotage are also explained
in detail in the publication ‘State Actors Threat Assessment’. This
CSAN discusses risks 2 (specifically ransomware, chapter 4) and 3
(breaches of cyberspace, chapter 5) in detail.
Looking back: Netherlands hit by wide
range of cyber incidents
In the period from March 2020 to March 2021, there were
numerous cyber incidents in or relating to the Netherlands.
Malicious parties especially exploited the current issue of COVID-19
to carry out attacks. Remote working services were also the target
of attacks. In addition, processes with a digital component were
made inaccessible and organisations in supply chains were
attacked. There were many incidents where large amounts of
vulnerable business and privacy-sensitive information were made
public. Lastly, unintentional failures led to outages.
The various incidents are discussed in detail in chapter 2
’Retrospective’.
Threat continues to evolve
COVID-19 exploited to carry out attacks
While the COVID-19 pandemic also led to social disruption in the
Netherlands, the digitisation of Dutch society enabled resilience
and continuity. Society has become even more digitised as a result
of the pandemic. Thanks to IT, commercial, educational and social
activities that threatened to come to a halt could continue, at least
in part. This places heavy demands on cyberspace, which has
become even more important to the functioning of society.
The pandemic has also led to shifts in the threat assessment. Actors
seize on current issues that dominate headlines worldwide to carry
out digital attacks. This also holds true for COVID-19. For example,
many phishing emails from cybercriminals and state actors last
year exploited COVID-19. Current events have also given rise to an
intelligence need among state actors. In relation to COVID-19, a
need for knowledge about vaccines arose, which resulted in digital
espionage and even the spreading of disinformation.
Disinformation around current issues such as the pandemic can
lead to polarisation because it fuels and magnifies differences of
opinion. One example of this is whether or not people trust
vaccines against COVID-19. It is conceivable that polarisation will
also get a digital component. For example, opponents of the
COVID-19 restrictions could express their dissatisfaction by
disrupting digital processes, such as by launching DDoS attacks
against public authorities or parties with different ideas. They
might also try to hack into public authorities to get information
that could put an authority in a bad light.
8
In the Netherlands, the pandemic has also led to increased
attention to risks and the (accelerated) implementation of
resilience-enhancing measures by companies and organisations,
for example in education. To what extent the initiatives to increase
resilience now and in the near future will be sufficient to curb the
evolving threat is difficult to assess. However, at present it does not
appear that the threat has been brought fully under control (see
below under ‘Resilience’).
Chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’ describes a number of cyber incidents
that occurred around COVID-19 in and in relation to the
Netherlands. Chapter 3 explains how the pandemic, as the most
important current issue, has affected the threat assessment.
Attacks can cause long-term damage to organisations and
chains
The impact of digital attacks varies. Some, such as DDoS attacks,
lead to short-term disruption of processes, paralysing websites for
a few hours. Other types of attacks, such as ransomware attacks,
have a long-term impact. Cybercriminals take time to infiltrate
victims’ networks, to find out how they can achieve maximum
disruption of processes and determine what would be an
‘appropriate’ (i.e. realistic) ransom amount. They often spend long
periods unseen in a network. They further increase the impact of
their attack by also rendering system backups unusable. In extreme
cases, the damage to systems is so severe that repair is impossible.
Then the only option left is to rebuild systems from scratch (which
sometimes even requires regathering lost data). When various
means of pressure are used, ransomware attacks can also have a
long-term impact on processes. In addition to making processes
inaccessible, the aim is to steal information, which the actor then
makes public or threatens to make public. Attackers can go a step
further by trying to extort their target’s customers. This can happen
quickly, or only after some time, in which case victims of a
ransomware attack may have to deal with the consequences of the
original attack for a long time.
Attacks with a long-term impact on processes are not only
launched by cybercriminals, but also by state actors. They use
backdoors to gain access to networks, for example, and remain
there unseen for a long time. Meanwhile, they explore the systems
and create new access points. In the case of the SolarWinds
campaign, for example, it was found that the Russian state actor
behind the attack had been inside the system for over a year before
being detected (see chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’). Furthermore, it has
been established that state actors launch targeted attacks against
cybersecurity companies and individual security researchers. This
gives them insight into the working methods of these security
companies and researchers and into any weaknesses in the security
of their customers. Actors can then use this knowledge to launch
new attacks.
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents