Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy 2022
significant impacts – from reputational, financial and operational implications, all the
way to severe safety and security outcomes. This is increasingly the case as IT and
OT systems become more interconnected.
•
And finally, increasing the sector’s technical maturity alone will not deliver good
cyber security: in considering what good looks like the importance of strategic
enablers such as leadership, governance and competence must be recognised. As
part of this, each partner – industry, ONR, supply chain, the NCSC and BEIS –
should take responsibility for those issues where it is uniquely placed to take action.
Building on existing frameworks for cyber security maturity such as the ONR’s Security
Assessment Principles (SyAPs) 8 and the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) 9, we
have developed a high-level model of good civil nuclear cyber security. These outcomes
outline what we want to achieve across all civil nuclear organisations, domains and systems
(Figure 6).
In support of this model, a maturity framework was commissioned by BEIS, with the support of
funding from the National Cyber Security Programme, to articulate some of these outcomes in
more detail, in particular the indicators of good practice in cyber risk mitigation. The maturity
framework was designed to be aligned with both the SyAPs and CAF, and outlined measurable
goals against the indicators set out in Figure 7. Our intention is to use this framework as an
objective assessor of cyber security maturity over time. Over the next five years this strategy
will prioritise action and investment where there is a clear priority or gap. However, we
recognise that new capabilities and challenges will arise over the life of the strategy. We will
therefore regularly monitor and evaluate sector maturity against these indicators, enabling us
to measure progress and redirect attention if priorities need to be adjusted.
Figure 6 – An overview of the CAF-aligned sector maturity framework used for the
Benchmarking Project
OBJECTIVE
PRINCIPLE
A1 Governance
A: Managing
Security Risk
A2 Risk Management
A3 Asset Management
A4 Supply Chain
B1 Service Protection Policies and Processes
B: Protecting
Against Cyber
Attack
B2 Identity and Access Control
B3 Data Security
B4 System Security
B5 Resilient Networks and Systems
B6 Staff Awareness and Training
8
9
C: Detecting Cyber
Security Events
C1 Security Monitoring
D: Minimising the
Impact of Cyber
Security Incidents
D1 Response and Recovery Planning
C2 Proactive Security Event Discovery
D2 Lessons Learned
Office for Nuclear Regulation’s Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) Framework
UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Guidance
15
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