Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy 2022 Figure 9 – A summary of the challenges identified through engagements across the sector RISK MANAGEMENT • • • Risks are not always managed holistically, risking security gaps and sub-optimal decisions, especially between the cyber, physical security and safety domains. Organisational cyber security strategies are not always clearly articulated, and are often focused on compliance, rather than risk management or cyber as an enabler. There is a lack of a common shared understanding of threats and risk appetites. This can lead to prescriptive regulatory interventions. RISK MITIGATION • Fast, agile implementation of improvements can be hampered by the significant scale and complexity of legacy operational systems. • The sector is facing significant, novel cyber security challenges as the technology and cyber threat landscape rapidly evolves. • Tackling the challenges of supplier assurance and new technology is difficult and requires cross-sector effort. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT • • Cyber incident response within and across organisations requires more frequent exercising and executive-level support. Monitoring of networks and detection of cyber incidents is a key area for improvement. CULTURE, COLLABORATION AND SKILLS • • The specialist nature of the civil nuclear sector and of cyber security can make recruitment and retention of diverse and suitably skilled personnel difficult. The culture can sometimes lack inclusively. Lack of cyber knowledge amongst key personnel and providers means cyber security is not mainstreamed across organisations 3.3 NCSC Threat Assessment Finally, our gap analysis took into account the likely trends and emerging cyber threats over the lifetime of the strategy. Reflecting the wider UK national picture as set out in the 2021 National Cyber Strategy, the key threats to civil nuclear are likely to be ransomware, Intellectual Property (IP) theft and an attack via the supply chain, as set out in Figure 10. This assessment of threat, along with the view from industry CISOs and the quantitative overview of sector maturity gives us a good picture of the context we should be writing the strategy within. Figure 10 – Threat Assessment for the civil nuclear sector over the next five years RANSOMWARE Ransomware almost certainly represents the most likely disruptive threat to the UK Civil Nuclear Sector. It’s a realistic possibility that current international efforts to combat ransomware will lead to an increase in worldwide attacks in the next 12 months, as ransomware actors seek to maximise their profits before anticipated changes make their operating environment more difficult. Ransomware will almost certainly continue to be opportunistic based on whether threat actors can obtain access to victims’ networks, but within that, favoured target sectors will be chosen based on perceived willingness to pay. Whilst data extortion has become a prominent tactic, the majority of ransomware attacks look 19

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