Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy 2022
Figure 9 – A summary of the challenges identified through engagements across the
sector
RISK MANAGEMENT
•
•
•
Risks are not always managed holistically, risking
security gaps and sub-optimal decisions, especially
between the cyber, physical security and safety
domains.
Organisational cyber security strategies are not
always clearly articulated, and are often focused on
compliance, rather than risk management or cyber
as an enabler.
There is a lack of a common shared understanding
of threats and risk appetites. This can lead to
prescriptive regulatory interventions.
RISK MITIGATION
• Fast, agile implementation of improvements can be
hampered by the significant scale and complexity of
legacy operational systems.
• The sector is facing significant, novel cyber security
challenges as the technology and cyber threat
landscape rapidly evolves.
• Tackling the challenges of supplier assurance and
new technology is difficult and requires cross-sector
effort.
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
•
•
Cyber incident response within and across
organisations requires more frequent exercising
and executive-level support.
Monitoring of networks and detection of cyber
incidents is a key area for improvement.
CULTURE, COLLABORATION AND SKILLS
•
•
The specialist nature of the civil nuclear sector and
of cyber security can make recruitment and
retention of diverse and suitably skilled personnel
difficult. The culture can sometimes lack
inclusively.
Lack of cyber knowledge amongst key personnel
and providers means cyber security is not
mainstreamed across organisations
3.3 NCSC Threat Assessment
Finally, our gap analysis took into account the likely trends and emerging cyber threats over
the lifetime of the strategy. Reflecting the wider UK national picture as set out in the 2021
National Cyber Strategy, the key threats to civil nuclear are likely to be ransomware,
Intellectual Property (IP) theft and an attack via the supply chain, as set out in Figure 10. This
assessment of threat, along with the view from industry CISOs and the quantitative overview of
sector maturity gives us a good picture of the context we should be writing the strategy within.
Figure 10 – Threat Assessment for the civil nuclear sector over the next five years
RANSOMWARE
Ransomware almost certainly represents the most likely disruptive threat to the
UK Civil Nuclear Sector. It’s a realistic possibility that current international efforts
to combat ransomware will lead to an increase in worldwide attacks in the next 12
months, as ransomware actors seek to maximise their profits before anticipated
changes make their operating environment more difficult.
Ransomware will almost certainly continue to be opportunistic based on whether
threat actors can obtain access to victims’ networks, but within that, favoured
target sectors will be chosen based on perceived willingness to pay. Whilst data
extortion has become a prominent tactic, the majority of ransomware attacks look
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