and legal mechanisms in place. It should nevertheless be recalled that due diligence is an obligation of conduct, not one of result. In general, what is required of States is that they take all measures that are feasible under the circumstances. A particular question in this regard is related to the position of transit States through which a particular harmful data is routed. Much depends on whether such a State has any knowledge of the ongoing operation, or ability to take feasible measures to terminate it. Furthermore, while States must show due diligence in the control of the national territory, doing so does not release them from the observance of other international obligations such as those related to human rights. State responsibility The law of State responsibility consists of secondary rules that apply generally in the absence of clear specific rules that modify their effect. As there is no specific regulation concerning State activities in cyberspace that would constitute such lex specialis, it can be concluded that the normal rules of State responsibility apply in cyberspace. When a State’s cyber operation violates its obligations under international law, it constitutes an internationally wrongful act. An internationally wrongful act of a State entails its international responsibility and gives rise to an obligation to make full reparation for the damage that may be caused by the act.19 This requires that the act is attributable to the State. The rules of attribution reflected in the UN International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility20 remain fully valid in cyberspace. If State organs, or private groups or individuals acting on behalf of the State, can be identified as the authors of a cyber operation that violates the State’s international obligations, its international responsibility is engaged. It is in this regard useful to distinguish identification as a technical operation from attribution as a legal operation. Identification may be technically challenging given the often covert nature of hostile cyber activities but this is without consequence to the legal rules of attribution. An internationally wrongful act may justify recourse to countermeasures by the injured State if the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act declines to cease the wrongful conduct or pay reparation. Countermeasures may only be taken with the purpose of ensuring compliance, not for retaliation. Countermeasures may furthermore not breach the prohibition of the threat or use of force, or other peremptory norms of general international law, and must be consistent with other customary law requirements and limitations concerning countermeasures, most of which are reflected in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. 21 Some of the procedural requirements concerning countermeasures may nevertheless require 19 International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), available at www.legal.un.org/ILC (ARSIWA) . 20 Ibid., arts. 4–11. 21 Ibid., arts. 49–54. 5

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