A/76/136
cyber operation or internationally wrongful act can be attributed. There is no
requirement for countermeasures to be of the same nature as the internationally
wrongful acts to which they are a response, and countermeasures in response to cyber
operations may therefore be carried out within or outside cyberspace.
Countermeasures must not violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force or
international humanitarian law.
The State held responsible should be notified of both the violation of
international law and the grounds for attribution, as well as of the intention to
introduce countermeasures. 201 Countermeasures may only be taken if a State has
sufficient grounds for attributing the conduct in question to a particular State under
international law. What constitutes sufficient grounds will be fact-specific and casespecific, and can be particularly challenging to determine in the case of cyber
operations. The State taking countermeasures must be confident in its attribution
before resorting to countermeasures. However, the State taking countermeasures need
not publish detailed grounds for its attribution or give a detailed technical account of
this to the State identified as responsible as this might reveal sensitive methods of
interception and detection or offensive and defensive capabilities.
Countermeasures may be taken without prior notification to the responsible
State if providing such notification might reveal sensitive methods or capabilities or
prevent the countermeasures from having the necessary effect. For example, the
injured State could carry out a cyber operation to disrupt the capability of the
aggressor State conducting the internationally wrongful cyber operation such as
election interference. This countermeasure would in other circumstances be in
violation of the aggressor State’s sovereignty.
5.3 Necessity
In a situation of necessity, a State may be able to respond to a cyber operation
in a way that is in principle in breach of an international obligation and nevertheless
not incur responsibility for its actions under international law.
Necessity refers to those exceptional situations where the only way a State can
safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril, whether
cyber in nature or not, is by temporary non-compliance with international obligations
of lesser weight or urgency. For instance, if infrastructure in a third country is used
in an internationally wrongful cyber operation, the injured State may under certain
conditions launch a cyber operation to destroy or disrupt the internationally wrongful
cyber operation, even if this violates the territorial sovereignty of the third State.
It is not a requirement that the preceding cyber operation must be attributable to
a particular State.
It should be emphasised that, according to customary law on state responsibility,
a number of conditions must be fulfilled before necessity can be invoked as a ground
for precluding wrongfulness. 202
5.4 Self-defence
A State that is the victim of a cyber operation that qualifies as an armed attack
under international law, may exercise its inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
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201
202
21-09670
ILC ASR Articles 43 and 52.
See Article 25 ILC ASR.
73/142
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