no public action may be instituted, under any Act of the Republic of Korea; (5) Where the
requesting country fails to give a guarantee although this Act prescribes that the requesting
country should do so.”
With mechanisms for requesting and obtaining evidence for criminal investigations and
prosecutions, MLATs remain one of the most comprehensive tools for building an interoperable
legal framework at the international level, and, therefore, for overcoming jurisdictional issues.
MLATs allow signatories to shift from strict territorial views to more comprehensive and cooperative
views,55 providing them with reciprocal abilities to obtain jurisdictional power over offenses (see
section 2 E, above).
MLATs, though effective tools, are far from perfect. Frequently, they are not particularly extensive,
and, in order for them to have effect, signatories typically must first introduce and domesticate the
treaty’s provisions into their own legal systems through legislation or other appropriate means.56
Moreover, it is commonly lamented that MLAT facilitation mechanisms are difficult and take time to
effectuate.57 While efforts are underway globally to improve these processes, many factors combine
to impede progress. Such hindrances are of particularly great concern in combatting cybercrime,
where evidence is often fragile and fleeting, and where it is found in a world—cyberspace—where
identity and anonymity are easily created and recreated. Similarly, as the location of the perpetrator
may be difficult to identify, determining which entities have control over the desired data may be
complicated. Indeed, even once the perpetrator’s location has been identified, the desired data
may not be so easy to identify and locate, a matter complicated both by the facile manner in which
data might be moved, and by technology developments, such as cloud computing, that allow the
fragmenting and (re)routing of data through several countries (see section 2 C, above).
All of the above elements together frequently make it unclear which state has legal jurisdiction
over the data. As a result, an increasing number of states are asserting jurisdiction to continue
electronic investigations even when, in the physical world, that action might be considered an
infringement of another state’s sovereignty. For instance, antitrust investigators of Belgium, Brazil,
and the EU, among others, assert the right to conduct electronic searches in certain circumstances,
even where they are aware that the search will take place outside of the physical territory in
which they have authority and know to which country an MLA request could be sent. While these
assertions of investigative jurisdiction may be proper under the law of the states or organizations
that undertaking such actions, they may be considered as improper by the states where the data is
located, or by the investigated party. As such, some states disallow such searches entirely, creating
further obstacles to interoperability.
As the principle challenge to MLA requests is typically lenghty response times,58 three of the major
multilateral treaties on cybercrime—the Budapest Convention,59 the CIS Agreement60 and the
Arab Convention61—seek to expedite matters by requiring Member States to designate pointsof-contact for MLA requests. Relatedly, in order to facilitate the gathering of electronic evidence,
Page 201 | Chapter 5 | § A. Multilateral Instruments & Cross-border Cooperation
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