A. General Aspects of Extradition Treaties
While MLATs focus on the cross-jurisdictional gathering and exchanging of information, extradition
treaties aim to create a means for giving jurisdiction over the perpetrator—what is frequently called
physical or personal jurisdiction—to the state desiring to prosecute (referred as the “requesting
state”). Extradition treaties are the most common form of international cooperation for obtaining
jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrator, who is often referred to as the “target”. Although
extradition is frequently included as an element in MLATs,70 separate, standalone agreements
are often agreed upon. The core provisions of an extradition agreement create assurances and
procedures for the custodial state to honor a warrant issued by the requesting state, thereby
obliging the custodial state to take the target into custody and arrange transfer to the requesting
state.71
Extradition treaties operate under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare—“extradite or
prosecute”.72 However, and notwithstanding that guiding principle, extradition agreements are
often limited by crime type,73 and have carve-outs and disallowances—for instance, the European
Convention on Extradition disallows extradition where the offense for which extradition is sought
is considered political in nature, or where it is punishable by death under the law of the requesting
state.74 In instances where the target is a national of the custodial state, or where the custodial state
has created some other legal basis necessary for prosecuting the target, that state may prosecute
and punish before extraditing to the requesting state.75
Where cybercrime is concerned, the effectiveness of extradition treaties may be hindered by the
requirement of what is called “dual criminality”. Dual criminality is the concept that extradition can
only be allowed if the allegedly illegal act is a crime in both states.76 For instance, in the case of the
“Love Bug” virus, the absence of legislation criminalizing computer crimes in the custodial state (in
this case, the Philippines) not only precluded local prosecution of the believed-Filipino hacker, but
also prevented foreign authorities (notably, the FBI) from seeking extradition under the applicable
agreement due to the requirement of dual criminality (see section 2 E, box 2.7, above).
B. Budapest Convention’s Extradition Provisions
The Budapest Convention includes specific provisions for extraditing a target.77 However, the
obligation to extradite is limited, first, to offenses established in accordance with the Convention,
second, by the principle of dual criminality, and, third, to offenses that are punishable by the
deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe penalty.78 This
last element—the threshold penalty—was introduced because it was not considered appropriate
to require that each of the offences be considered per se extraditable, as Parties might, in their
own sovereign discretion, prescript different incarceration periods.79 It bears noting that the
determination of whether an offender is extraditable hinges upon the maximum period that
may legally be imposed for a violation, not upon the actual penalty imposed.80 Moreover, the
Page 203 | Chapter 5 | § A. Multilateral Instruments & Cross-border Cooperation
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