L 333/92
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
27.12.2022
coordinated vulnerability disclosure). Where the reported vulnerability could have significant impact on entities in
more than one Member State, the CSIRTs designated as coordinators should cooperate within the CSIRTs network,
where appropriate.
(62)
Access to correct and timely information about vulnerabilities affecting ICT products and ICT services contributes to
an enhanced cybersecurity risk management. Sources of publicly available information about vulnerabilities are an
important tool for the entities and for the users of their services, but also for the competent authorities and the
CSIRTs. For that reason, ENISA should establish a European vulnerability database where entities, regardless of
whether they fall within the scope of this Directive, and their suppliers of network and information systems, as well
as the competent authorities and the CSIRTs, can disclose and register, on a voluntary basis, publicly known
vulnerabilities for the purpose of allowing users to take appropriate mitigating measures. The aim of that database
is to address the unique challenges posed by risks to Union entities. Furthermore, ENISA should establish an
appropriate procedure regarding the publication process in order to give entities the time to take mitigating
measures as regards their vulnerabilities and employ state-of-the-art cybersecurity risk-management measures as
well as machine-readable datasets and corresponding interfaces. To encourage a culture of disclosure of
vulnerabilities, disclosure should have no detrimental effects on the reporting natural or legal person.
(63)
Although similar vulnerability registries or databases exist, they are hosted and maintained by entities which are not
established in the Union. A European vulnerability database maintained by ENISA would provide improved
transparency regarding the publication process before the vulnerability is publicly disclosed, and resilience in the
event of a disruption or an interruption of the provision of similar services. In order, to the extent possible, to avoid
a duplication of efforts and to seek complementarity, ENISA should explore the possibility of entering into
structured cooperation agreements with similar registries or databases that fall under third-country jurisdiction. In
particular, ENISA should explore the possibility of close cooperation with the operators of the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) system.
(64)
The Cooperation Group should support and facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information, as well
as strengthen trust and confidence among Member States. The Cooperation Group should establish a work
programme every two years. The work programme should include the actions to be undertaken by the Cooperation
Group to implement its objectives and tasks. The timeframe for the establishment of the first work programme
under this Directive should be aligned with the timeframe of the last work programme established under Directive
(EU) 2016/1148 in order to avoid potential disruptions in the work of the Cooperation Group.
(65)
When developing guidance documents, the Cooperation Group should consistently map national solutions and
experiences, assess the impact of Cooperation Group deliverables on national approaches, discuss implementation
challenges and formulate specific recommendations, in particular as regards facilitating an alignment of the
transposition of this Directive among Member States, to be addressed through a better implementation of existing
rules. The Cooperation Group could also map the national solutions in order to promote compatibility of
cybersecurity solutions applied to each specific sector across the Union. This is particularly relevant to sectors that
have an international or cross-border nature.
(66)
The Cooperation Group should remain a flexible forum and be able to react to changing and new policy priorities
and challenges while taking into account the availability of resources. It could organise regular joint meetings with
relevant private stakeholders from across the Union to discuss activities carried out by the Cooperation Group and
gather data and input on emerging policy challenges. Additionally, the Cooperation Group should carry out a
regular assessment of the state of play of cyber threats or incidents, such as ransomware. In order to enhance
cooperation at Union level, the Cooperation Group should consider inviting relevant Union institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies involved in cybersecurity policy, such as the European Parliament, Europol, the European Data
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