A/76/136
normal course of events would have become aware that its territory was being used
for harmful cyber operations. 197 This implies that the criterion that a State ‘should
have known’ is more likely to be met if for instance the operation used publicly known
and easily detected malware, as opposed to highly sophisticated and previously
unknown malware.
There is currently no legal basis for a general obligation to prevent cyber
operations, and States are consequently not under an obligation to monitor all cyber
activities on their territories. 198
Norway considers the due diligence obligation to be of particular importance in
a cyber context. In situations where a targeted State cannot directly attribute
(technically and legally) a wrongful cyber operation – for instance election
interference – to the State from whose territory it is being carried out, the territorial
State may nevertheless still be held accountable on the basis of a breach of the due
diligence obligation.
Response measures
5
The response measures an injured State may take under international law depend
on the severity and nature of the cyber operation and on whether the legally
responsible actor behind it is another State or a non-State actor.
5.1 Retorsion
A State may respond to any form of cyber operation by retorsion. Retorsion
refers to the taking of measures that are lawful but unfriendly, directed against another
State. Retorsion may therefore be used regardless of whether international law has
been violated and regardless of whether State responsibility applies. Examples of acts
of retorsion are breaking off or limiting diplomatic relations, for instance by declaring
a diplomat persona non grata, or the imposition of sanctions. Publicly declaring that
another State is responsible for a cyber operation is in itself an act of retorsion.
5.2 Countermeasures
If a State is the victim of an internationally wrongful cyber operation and
another State can be held responsible under customary international law on State
responsibility, the injured State may, depending on the circumstances, be entitled to
take countermeasures.
A countermeasure is an act that would otherwise be contrary to international
law, but where the injured State can invoke the prior internationally wrongful act 199
as a ground for precluding wrongfulness. 200 If there is doubt regarding the attribution
of a cyber operation to a State under international law, it may be preferable for the
injured State to make use of acts of retorsion rather than countermeasures in order to
avoid the possibility of incurring State responsibility for its response.
Countermeasures may only be taken to induce a State to cease an internationally
wrongful act or resume its compliance with an international obligation. They are not
to be used for punishment and retaliation. Countermeasures must be limited to what
is considered necessary and proportional, and may only target the State to which the
__________________
197
198
199
200
72/142
See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to Rule 6, p. 41.
A general obligation of full control and prevention in the cyber context could be problematic in
relation to a State’s obligations under international human rights law.
In this document, ‘internationally wrongful acts’ must be understood as including both actions and
omissions, see Articles 1 and 2 ILC ASR.
See Articles 22 and 49–54 ILC ASR.
21-09670
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