ISO/IEC TR 29123:2007 Identification Cards – Proximity ISO http://www.iso.org Cards – Requirements for the enhancement of interoperability Legislation and Regulation 11.6.58. Further references onLegislation and Regulation can be found at: References SR 2001/240 Title Publisher Source Radiocommunications Act 1989 Parliamentary Counsel Office http://www.legislation.govt.nz Radiocommunications Parliamentary Counsel Office http://www.legislation.govt.nz Radiocommunications New Zealand Gazette Office, https://gazette.govt.nz/notice/id/201 Regulations (Prohibited Equipment - Radio Jammer Government Information Services, Department of Internal Affairs 1-go4051 Ministry of Business, Innovation and http://www.rsm.govt.nz/ Regulations 2001, Reprint as at 1 February 2015 Equipment) Notice 2011 Radio Spectrum Management Employment Rationale & Controls 11.6.59. Risk Assessment 11.6.59.R.01. Rationale As with many technologies, adoption of RFID has the potential to introduce a wide range of risks in addition to the risks that already exist for agency systems. This may include privacy risks, depending on the use, information held and implementation of the RFID system. A risk assessment is an essential tool in determining and assessing the range and extent of risk and threat in the use of RFID devices. 11.6.59.R.02. Rationale Risks to RFID system vary according to the technology used, system engineering, the systems architecture, application, context and deployment scenario. A holistic approach to risk at each stage of the system life cycle and each for system component is essential if a robust security strategy is to be developed. 11.6.59.R.03. Rationale The identification of classes of tags is fundamental to managing the risks of RFID devices in secure spaces. Classes 0 and 1 pose little risk. Other classes of tag (2 to 5), however, have limited data storage capability and active tags include transmitter functionality which introduces higher levels of risk. RFID readers are, by definition, transmitters and are not permitted in secure spaces. 11.6.59.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST [CID:2956] Agencies MUST conduct and document a risk assessment before implementing or adopting an RFID solution. 11.6.59.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST [CID:2957] This risk assessment MUST be the basis of a security architecture design. 11.6.60. Security Architecture 11.6.60.R.01. Rationale The foundation of strong security architecture in RFID follows three important principles: Controlled access to the data – only authorised entities (people, systems, devices) can read and write information to and from the RFID tags (EPC number, tag identifier, kill password, access password and user memory) and RFID databases; Control over access to the system – only authorised entities can configure or add devices to the system, and all devices on the system are authentic and trustworthy; Confidence and trust – back-end systems are designed and implemented in accordance with the current version of the NZISM. 11.6.60.R.02. Rationale Sensitive data should be held in a secure RFID Enterprise Subsystem and retrieved using the tag’s unique identifier with only an identifier stored on the tag itself. The Enterprise RFID subsystem should be established as a separate domain where data can be more adequately protected. This structure makes it more difficult for adversaries to obtain information from the tag through scanning or eavesdropping. Data encryption and access control is often more cost-effectively performed in the enterprise subsystem than in the RF subsystem. 11.6.60.R.03. Rationale 141 Version_3.5__January-2022

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