Reference Title Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography Publisher Source NIST National Institute for Standards and https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04282021.pdf Technology Post-Quantum Cryptography Project (NIST) NIST National Institute for Standards and https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/postquantum-cryptography Technology Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration To Post-Quantum Department of Homeland Security (US DHS) National Cybersecurity Center of Cryptography Excellence (US NCCoE) https://www.dhs.gov/quantum https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/ default/files/library/projectdescriptions/pqc-migration-projectdescription-final.pdf Rationale & Controls 2.4.13. Post-Quantum Cryptography Preparation 2.4.13.R.01. Rationale International organisations are in the process of developing standards for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. The standards will be reviewed and incorporated into the NZISM as they are published. 2.4.13.R.02. Rationale As standards are still under development the form of post-quantum cryptography is not fully determined at this point in time. 2.4.13.R.03. Rationale It is recognised that providing guidance on the concrete and achievable steps that can be taken now to prepare for the transition to postquantum cryptography will help ensure a smooth and efficient transition to any new standards that become available. 2.4.13.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7206] Agencies SHOULD ensure they are aware of the latest developments in post-quantum cryptography. GCSB is tracking these developments and will continue to provide advice through the NZISM. 2.4.13.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7207] Agencies SHOULD maintain an inventory of sensitive and criticaldatasets that must be secured for an extended amount of time. This will ensure datasets that may be at risk now and decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is available are not secured solely through the use of quantum vulnerable cryptography. 2.4.13.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7208] Agencies SHOULD conduct an inventory of systems using cryptographic technologies to determine the potential size and scope of future transition work once post-quantum cryptographic systems become available. 2.4.13.C.04. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7209] Agencies SHOULD identify which systems in their inventory rely on public key cryptography and note them as quantum vulnerable in agency risk assessments. 2.4.13.C.05. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7210] Agencies SHOULD determine a priority order for quantum vulnerable systems to be transitioned from classical cryptography to post-quantum cryptography. 2.4.13.C.06. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7211] Agencies SHOULD consider the following factors when prioritising the quantum vulnerable systems: Is the system a high value asset based on agency requirements? Does the system protect sensitive information (e.g. key stores, passwords, root keys, signing keys, personally identifiable information, and classified information)? Do other systems (internal or external to the agency) depend on the cryptographic protections in place on the quantum vulnerable system? How long does the data need to be protected? 2.4.13.C.07. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:7212] Using the inventory and prioritisation information, agencies SHOULD develop a plan for system transitions upon publication of the new postquantum cryptographic standard. 3. Information security governance - roles and responsibilities 3.1. The Agency Head 19 Version_3.5__January-2022

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