17.1.36. The New Zealand National Standard for High Assurance Cryptographic Equipment (HACE) and related key management is contained in theNew
Zealand Communications Security Policy No. 301 – Safeguarding of Communications Security (COMSEC) Material. This prescribes
national doctrine for the safeguarding of COMSEC materials. New Zealand Communications Security Policy No. 301 – Safeguarding of Communications
Security (COMSEC) Material, replaces New Zealand Communications Security Standard No. 300 – Control of COMSEC Material which is now withdrawn.
Note NZCSP 301 is a RESTRICTED document.
Protection of RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE information in transit over public systems
17.1.37. The physical requirements for protection of information classified RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE are provided by the classification system and PSR guidance.
17.1.38. Where such information is generated and held on information systems (any computer device, including laptops, mobile phones, tablets, desktop and
networked systems), the requirements of the NZISM apply. Of particular note is the requirement to encrypt RESTRICTED/SENSITIVE data when in transit
over public systems, including any Internet connection, public network or any other network NOT directly controlled by the agency.
Encryption and Key Management
17.1.39. Direct agency control is described as the immediate and continuous physical and logical control, responsibility for, protection and operation of
agency information systems and data (see 2.2.4).
17.1.40. Indirect agency control is described as when information is not under the direct control of the agency, this may be through outsourcing, ICT
management or services, third party facilities such as data centre co-locations, or consumption of cloud services (see 2.2.5 – 2.2.7).
17.1.41. Encryption can be used to protect information not under the direct control of the agency.
17.1.42. The use of encryption (including data encryption, use of a VPN or any other form of protection using cryptography) requires cryptographic key
management and the retention of control of both keys and key management processes.
17.1.43. Where agencies make use of VPNs or other forms of network connectivity that protect data in transit, the control and management of the cryptographic
key is fundamental to the integrity and confidentiality of the encrypted data.
17.1.44. If encryption keys are compromised, then any authentication and encryption mechanisms that rely on those keys, no matter how robust or
comprehensive, are futile.
17.1.45. If encryption keys are lost, damaged, or fail then access to data encrypted using those keys will also be lost. If control of encryption keys is lost, then
those keys should be considered to be compromised and must be replaced or superceded urgently.
17.1.46. The selection of the cryptographic protocol and algorithm is described in this chapter and specified in 17.1.55.C.02. It is essential that agencies select
and use only approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols (see section 17.2 – Approved Cryptographic Protocols) and apply the cryptographic key
management requirements of the NZISM (see section 17.9 - Key Management).
VPN connection Security
17.1.47. The types of encryption, protocols, and cryptographic algorithms applied in the establishment and maintenance of a VPN connection are fundamental
to the security and integrity of the connection.
17.1.48. Key aspects of VPN security include:
The encryption algorithm and protocol used;
Cryptographic key length;
The authentication protocol
Key Exchange protocol;
Selection of VPN protocol;
VPN monitoring and a “kill switch” to deter IP leakage and snooping;
Cryptographic key management.
17.1.49. It is important to understand that a variety of VPN services can use a variety of mechanisms. Agencies should also consider the service provider’s use
of hash authentication, perfect forward secrecy, and the difference in encryption settings on both the data and control channels. The NZISM specifies
the cryptographic protocols and cryptographic algorithms that should be used (see sections 17.2 – Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and 17.3 –
Approved Cryptographic Protocols) and agencies must ensure the VPN connection conforms with these requirements.
References
17.1.50. Further references can be found at:
Reference
NZCSP 301
Title
New Zealand Communications
Publisher
GCSB
Source
Contact the GCSB
Security Policy 301 - Safeguarding of
RESTRICTED document avaliable on
Communications Security (COMSEC)
application to authorised personnel
Material, NZCSP 301 replaces NZCSS
300
NZCSS 500
New Zealand Communications
GCSB
Security Standard No. 500 - Policy
Contact the GCSB
RESTRICTED document avaliable on
application to authorised personnel
PSR
Handling requirements for
protectively marked information and
equipment
NZ Government Protective
Security Requirements
https://protectivesecurity.govt.nz/inf
ormation-security/classificationsystem-and-handlingrequirements/handlingrequirements/
233
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