agenda, which may be in the personal interests, economic interests or interests of external actors, also pose
a risk. In terms of CIA triad risks, the security of data sent through 5G networks can be evaluated as follows:
Confidentially: Confidentiality, i.e. ensuring that data is not accessed by unauthorised actors, is a problematic
aspect of electronic communications networks, which applies both to 5G networks and the previous mobile
systems. The risk of attacks by external actors is low, but there is a significant risk on the part of some
suppliers, with regard to their close links to state actors with potentially problematic interests, which are
against the interests of the Czech Republic. Even when encrypted communication is used, network traffic
produces a large amount of metadata that can be of value to an attacker. The second problem is the
possibility of breaking the encryption. Encryption can be broken in the future when sufficient technical
resources (e.g. quantum computers) are developed. If an attacker stores certain data, they can break it at a
later time. Information gathered in this way may also be worthwhile for the attacker. The structure and
nature of electronic communications networks is then an effective tool for collecting this data for suppliers
with malicious intent.
Integrity: Data integrity (i.e. the assurance that data has not been altered by a foreign actor) is the least
threatened area in electronic communications networks, provided that end encryption is used. Data is only
present on the network for a short period of time, thus reducing vulnerability. Only if the attacker had the
encryption key or other form of backdoor that allows fast decryption, would they be able to compromise the
integrity of the data in real time.
Vulnerability: Each digital infrastructure of 5G networks can be associated with a variety of generic technical
weaknesses. These can affect SW or HW or arise from possible security errors in internal security control
processes. Due to the fact that 5G networks will be largely SW-based, there is a significant risk and
vulnerability of the entire network due to improper SW development, deliberate programming of SW with
unsolicited specific functionality for monitoring, collecting and sending information via hidden interfaces via
backdoors. In addition, it is likely that other 5G network security vulnerabilities may arise, especially in
connection with software transition and virtualisation through Software Definition Networks (SDN) along
with Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV)
Availability: Data availability is the primary vulnerability of electronic communications networks. Although
decentralisation increases the resilience of network to external threats, the strengthened role of suppliers in
5G networks increases vulnerability on their part. In the event of an attempt to disrupt data availability,
suppliers have a significant advantage in the form of direct network control or the ability to control some of
its elements through backdoors, etc. When an operator, provider or attacker makes key parts of a network
inoperable from outside, important data transmitted through the network will almost certainly become
unavailable.
5.2
Emphasis on supply chain security
Although 5G networks do not bring new fundamental weaknesses and, on the contrary, can strengthen
security features against external attacks due to their higher degree of decentralisation, they show increased
vulnerability to abuse by suppliers. This is mainly due to the increased complexity of the computing devices
necessary to operate 5G networks. These devices may contain both software and hardware weaknesses. In
the case of unintentional security vulnerabilities, they pose an increased risk of attack by external actors, but
above all, they represent the possibility of deliberate abuse by the supplier. As the Huawei Cyber Security
Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) report in the UK pointed out, not even developed states are technologically
capable of examining a sufficient number of suppliers' products in a timely manner, and close cooperation
between state and supplier, as in this case, is the key. Thus, computing devices that will be part of the 5G
networks infrastructure can hide both inadvertent and intentional weaknesses utilised by the supplier,
which cannot be effectively traced and eliminated. However, 5G networks cannot operate without these
computing capacities. For example, antennas using signal beam formation, one of the key elements of 5G
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