JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM | ASSESSMENT
involving explosives or simple chemicals such
as toxic gases (for example chlorine gas) require relatively few resources and little effort
on the part of the perpetrators. The perpetrators do, however, need to have the appropriate
expertise. Jihadists will therefore continue to
be not only willing but also able to carry out
both simple and more complex attacks. The
FIS considers that, for the time being, the only
threat likely to have been diminished by the
destruction of ‘Islamic State’'s caliphate is that
of complex attacks controlled and carried out
directly by ‘Islamic State’.
Switzerland as a possible target
Switzerland is part of the Western world,
classified by jihadists as Islamophobic, and
thus from their point of view constitutes a
legitimate target for terrorist attacks. However, in the FIS's assessment– based on jihadist
propaganda and on attacks that have taken
place and those that have been thwarted – the
focus is more on other countries. In the event
of attacks on Swiss territory, therefore, the interests of other states that are perceived by jihadists as being Islamophobic or which play a
prominent role in the international fight against
jihadism may also be targeted. Jewish interests
may also be affected.
The FIS assesses that attacks involving minimal logistical effort, carried out by individual
perpetrators or small groups, are currently the
most likely threat in Switzerland. In the FIS's
view, the risk of copycat attacks in Switzerland
will rise temporarily after each attack abroad.
Such attacks will not necessarily be jihad-motivated, but may also have a different motive.
The perpetrators are most likely to be individuals radicalised in Switzerland who have been
inspired by jihadist propaganda and personal
contacts, but who are not in direct contact with
a jihadist group or organisation. These include
attacks by mentally ill perpetrators whose radicalisation is more the result of their illness than
of ideological conviction. Switzerland can also
be used by jihadists as a logistics base for the
preparation of attacks abroad or as a transit
country. The most recent example of this is
the itinerary followed by two people who were
involved in the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in August 2017.
In the areas outside Europe in which jihadist
groups operate, there is still a risk that Swiss
citizens might fall victim to opportunist abductions or acts of violence.
Fewer jihad travellers with links to
Switzerland
‘Homegrown’ jihadists radicalised in Switzerland have become more significant to the
threat assessment than jihad-motivated travellers. The decline in travel to conflict zones by
jihadists with links to Switzerland can be attributed to a number of factors. Reports about the
harsh living conditions and ultimately the collapse of the caliphate have reduced the appeal
of Syria and Iraq to jihad-motivated fighters. In
addition, the enhanced countermeasures on the
travel routes to Syria and Iraq have made it significantly more difficult to access the conflict
area. Lastly, ‘Islamic State’'s appeals to jihadists to carry out attacks in their own country of
origin or residence rather than travelling to its
territory have probably also had an effect.
Left:
User with links to Switzerland
shares a martyrdom video.
SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 8 | FIS
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