ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE | ASSESSMENT
resources and capabilities to act either within the framework of a larger campaign or in
a mostly autonomous way. In the tradition of
the Soviet Union, influence operations conducted by intelligence services are referred to
as ‘active measures’. The main focus is on the
recruitment by the intelligence services of socalled influence agents. These are handled in
the same way as sources, but are primarily used
for the dissemination rather than the procurement of information. This information does not
necessarily have to be false. By skilfully blending facts, false information and opinions, the
desired narratives can be disseminated in a way
that is tailored to requirements. The portfolio
of active measures also includes the leaking of
information procured using intelligence tools.
This can be used, for example, to discredit undesirable persons or organisations. Allegedly
leaked information may also be made up or falsified. For the work of influence agents to be
effective, it usually requires coordination with
other agencies, such as teams that design narratives, plan actions or distribute information
themselves over the Internet. The target groups
of the active measures often do not realise that
they are the focus of an influence operation.
Sabotage operations may, for ecample, use
targeted attacks on industrial control systems.
These are still rare. So far, only five malware
complexes that have been specifically aimed at
industrial control systems are known. Probably
the most famous in this context is Stuxnet, a
malware that was discovered in 2010. It was
used to destroy centrifuges in uranium enrichment plants in Iran. Mention should also be
made of the attacks on the power supply in
80
SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S
Ukraine in December 2016, using the Crashoverride malware. This was the first incident
where a malware program designed to attack
a power network was actually used. However,
such attacks have so far been used very conservatively. This is probably due to the fact
that this type of operation always causes incalculable damage, which also makes the consequences for the attacker unpredictable. For this
reason, this type of tool is used for targeted attacks on specific system configurations, which
makes the attack correspondingly elaborate.
The most recent example is the Triton/Trisis
malware, which was aimed at the security control system of a target in the Middle East.
Increasingly, industrial control systems and
their operators are being spied on, possibly in
order to gain an overview of ways in which
they could be manipulated and to be prepared
for all future eventualities. The prime example
here is the attacks involving the Dragonfly 2.0
complex. At the end of June 2014, an espionage and sabotage preparation campaign called
Dragonfly came to light, which was targeted at
Western industrial installations and energy suppliers. The follow-up campaign, Dragonfly 2.0,
was uncovered in 2017. This version also involves sending e-mails with malware attached
to selected employees in the target company. In
addition, the repertoire of this espionage complex once again includes targeted infections via
websites and trojans. The campaign is primarily aimed at targets in the US and Europe.
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents