against serious physical harm will be an ‘essential interest’ of each State – regardless of whether a critical infrastructure is targeted or not. Nevertheless, given the exceptional character of the necessity argument, an ‘essential interest’ must not be assumed prematurely. A case-by-case assessment is necessary to determine whether a peril is ‘grave’. The more important an ‘essential interest’ is for the basic functioning of a State, the lower the threshold of the ‘gravity’ criterion should be. Germany agrees that a ‘grave peril’ does not presuppose the occurrence of physical injury but may also be caused by large-scale functional impairments.72 A State, when confronted with a cyber threat, does not yet need to have assessed the total and final damage potential in order to invoke necessity.73 Necessity may be invoked when the origin of a cyber measure has not (yet) been clearly established;74 however, States should always make efforts to clarify attribution and (State) responsibility in order to be able to substantiate their grounds for action. (4) Self-defence The right to self-defence according to art. 51 UN Charter is triggered if an armed attack occurs. Malicious cyber operations can constitute an armed attack whenever they are comparable to traditional kinetic armed attack in scale and effect. Germany concurs with the view expressed in rule 71 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0. Furthermore, Germany acknowledges the view expressed in the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment, namely that an armed attack constitutes the gravest form of use of force.75 Assessing whether the scale and effects of the cyber operation are grave enough to consider it an armed attack is a political decision taken in the framework of international law. Physical destruction of property, injury and death (including as an indirect effect) and serious territorial incursions are relevant factors. The decision is not made based only on technical information, but also after assessing the strategic context and the effect of the cyber operation beyond cyberspace. This decision is not left to the discretion of the State victim of such a malicious cyber operation, but needs to be comprehensibly reported to the international community, i.e. the UN Security Council, according to art. 51 UN Charter. The response to malicious cyber operations constituting an armed attack is not limited to cyber counter-operations. Once the right to self-defence is triggered, the State under attack can resort to all necessary and proportionate means in order to end the attack. Self72 73 74 75 Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 26, commentary, para. 4. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 25, commentary, para. 16: ‘[…] a measure of uncertainty about the future does not necessarily disqualify a State from invoking necessity, if the peril is clearly established on the basis of the evidence reasonably available at the time.’ Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 26, commentary, para. 11. Reasonableness standards apply to ex ante determinations depending on the context; see also Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), Chapter 4, Introduction to Section 1, para. 9-11. ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (note 21), para. 191. 15

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