British Army in July 2021, and the Rapid Trident 2021 joint exercise with the U.S. Army in September 2021, involving many participating countries, mainly NATO member states. (3) The Rekindling of Military Tension after the Fall of 2021 3 surface missiles equipped with conventional warheads such as Kalibr and Iskander as well as with strategic nuclear forces. Through these series of exercises, Russia further increased military tension in the region and used the exercises as an opportunity to mass troops around Ukraine. On February 21, 2022, President Putin held a Security Council meeting and confirmed that the senior members of his administration approved of the recognition of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” by the pro-Russian separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. Following this confirmation, he recognized their “independence” and signed the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” with the heads of these two “Republics.” In addition, the president ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense to conduct peacekeeping operations by the AFRF in the territory of these “Republics,” claiming that he had received a request from the “Republics” for support based on the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” and requested the Federation Council (the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) to approve the dispatch of Russian troops to the outside of Russia. This made it clear that Russia had the will to take military operations at least in eastern Ukraine. At that time it was thought that 120 BTGs—a force approximately 170,000 to 190,000 strong—were concentrated in Belarus and Russia and on the Crimean Peninsula and that Russia could launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In response to Russia’s increasing its forces around the Ukrainian border and on the Crimean Peninsula and in order to prepare against a possible Russian invasion, Ukraine started in January of the same year to organize the Territorial Defense Forces (25 brigades across the country) that is mainly structured with reservists and complements a standing army. Ukraine also launched the Zametil 2022 command and staff exercise across the country on February 9, 2022, as a counter move to the Russia–Belarus Allied Resolve joint exercise. Chapter 2 Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine It is pointed out that after late October 2021, more than one month after the end of the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise, U.S. and U.K. intelligence authorities released their evaluation that Russian troops might invade Ukraine in early 2022 because the equipment of Central Military District units, which was left as they were around the border with Ukraine under the pretext of participating in the exercise in the spring of 2021, did not return to the base and actively disclosed their intelligence and analyses of Russia’s possible aggression against Ukraine. In addition, focusing on Russia continuously increasing its forces especially around the Ukrainian border, the United States and other related countries urged Russia to ease tensions through diplomatic efforts and also expressed their will to support Ukraine by means other than dispatching troops to the country, including arms supply. While Russia consistently denied the indications of the United States and other related countries that it might invade Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry released its own draft of a treaty and agreement with the United States and NATO on the non-expansion of NATO in December 2021, practically demanding that the United States and other NATO member states recognize the former Soviet states as Russia’s “sphere of influence” by claiming that Russia would not allow more of those countries, including Ukraine, to join NATO. While Russia continued in and after January 2022 to negotiate with the United States and NATO in relation to this move, it conducted a succession of exercises, including an exercise with all Russian Navy fleets participating in it, the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise with Eastern Military District units as the main force that were deployed from the Far East to Belarus by railway transport, and a strategic deterrence forces exercise with surface-to-  How Russia Started an Aggression against Ukraine and an Outlook on It 1 The Failure of Russia’s Blitzkrieg and Ukraine’s Defense in an Early Battle On February 24, 2022, Russia started a full-scale aggression against Ukraine under the plea of a “Special Military Operation” to disarm Ukraine in order to protect the residents of “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic.” DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 10

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