China Section 2
3
4
5
advanced technology and becoming an “innovation
superpower.”3 In light of this, it is suggested that China
is planning to offset its military power gap with the U.S.
military, and may recognize that the “intelligentization”
of its forces is a necessary condition for this. It is thought
that China will aim to build a military that “can fight and
win a war” against the U.S. military in the “intelligentized
warfare” in the future.4
Based on that recognition, it is expected that China
will further accelerate the military modernization against
the backdrop of national power development and General
Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP
and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central
Military Commission5.
3 Transparency Concerning Defense
Policies and Military Affairs
Chapter
3
China has neither set out a clear and specific future
vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate
transparency of its decision-making process in relation to
military and security affairs. China has released a defense
white paper almost every two years since 1998. Most
recently, it released a defense white paper in July 2019 for
the first time in approximately four years. The latest one
was titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era.”
In those publications as well, China has not fully
disclosed information such as specific weapons in
possession, procurement goals and results, organization
and locations of major units, records of main military
operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its
national defense budget.
Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually
inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding
Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting
concerns over China’s military decision-making and
actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese
Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around
the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but
China did not acknowledge this. Similarly, in the cases
of submarines presumed to belong to China that were
confirmed in the contiguous zone around Amami Oshima
Island in June 2020 and September 2021, China did not
Defense Policies of Countries
waters to protect its expanding overseas interests.
Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only
physical means but also non-physical means in military
affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three
Warfares” - “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,”
and “Legal Warfare” - as part of the political work of
the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of
coordinating military struggle closely with political,
diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.
As for the future goals of the development of national
defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s
report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017
and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that
China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization
and make great progress in informatization to dramatically
improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically
complete the modernization of national defense and military
forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces
into world-class forces by the mid-21st century. These
goals reportedly indicate that the third stage of the “Three
Stage Development Strategy” for the basic modernization
of national defense and military forces by the middle of
the 21st century would be achieved 15 years ahead of
schedule. The goals thus might have been based on fasterthan-expected progress in the military modernization for
China itself. In addition, during the 5th Plenary Session of
the 19th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2020,
China expressed its determination to achieve a struggle
goal for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PLA
in 2027. The same was reemphasized at the 6th Plenary
Session in 2021. This goal could have been newly set as
an interim goal up to the second stage with the deadline for
achievement in 2035, following the near achievement of
the goal of the first stage described above.
However, China has recognized a wide gap between the
real military modernization level and the level required for
national security, and between Chinese and world-class
military forces. Although China has not defined what it
means by “world-class forces,” it has been pointed out that
China may seek to develop a military that is equal to - or in
some cases superior to - the U.S. military. Furthermore, it has
also been pointed out that China aims to build “world-class
forces” capable of “intelligentized warfare” by acquiring
According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021).
There is a view that “intelligentization” of the military provides an excellent opportunity for a latecomer’s military to leap ahead in development and thereby rapidly surpass other advanced-level
militaries.
The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists
of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces.
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
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