approaches to cybercrime. It is clear that, in some cases, divergences found at the national level are
also present at the international level. Examples of these include the inclusion, or not, of ‘illegal
remaining’ in multilateral instruments; the limitation, or not, of interception to ‘non-public’
transmissions; the possibility for criminalization of ‘reckless’ data or system interference; and the
inclusion, or exclusion, of ‘access codes’ in computer misuse tool provisions. As discussed in
Chapter Three (Legislation and frameworks), it is challenging to trace the exact influence of binding
and non-binding instruments on national legislation. It is possible, in some cases, that a two-way
process is at work – with national legislative approaches influencing the development of
international and regional instruments, and vice versa. While such analysis can be perceived as merely
technical, the details of cybercrime criminal offences matter. As discussed in Chapter Seven
(International cooperation), for example, in some countries detailed offence aspects such as the ‘use
of technical means’ to commit an offence (in the case of illegal interception, for instance) can be
considered to be constituent elements of the crime – meaning that there is no crime unless they are
present. In such circumstances, the details of the crime can have an impact on requirements for dual
criminality and, ultimately, on effective international cooperation.
On the other hand, the detailed analysis reveals a number of good practices in the
development of criminal laws for cybercrime acts. The creation of a clear distinction in national laws
between illegal access to, and interference with¸ computer systems and data, for example, is important in
order to ensure that separate acts can be correctly distinguished. The use of aggravating
circumstances may be an effective mechanism for tailoring ‘core’ offences to particular national
concerns, while maintaining basic offences that can be harmonized with international and regional
standards. In order to avoid over-criminalization, many countries ensure that provisions on
computer-misuse tools require both that the tool is primarily designed for the commission of an
offence, and that the perpetrator intended to use it for such. Requirements of intentionality with
respect to illegal interference with computer data and systems are also important for ensuring that
negligent or reckless acts are not subject to disproportionate criminal sanctions.
The balance of appropriate criminalization is even more challenging with respect to
computer content-related offences than it is for offences against the confidentiality, integrity and
accessibility of computer systems. Even in an area well covered by international standards such as
child pornography, for example, state approaches show divergence with respect to the inclusion, or
exclusion, of simulated material, and regarding the age of the child protected. One key external
standard that offers guidance in this area is international human rights law. The next section of this
Chapter examines the contribution that this body of international law can make in assisting states to
achieve an acceptable balance between crime prevention and control, and the protection of
individual liberties.
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