CHAPTER FIVE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATIONS
is substantial. As discussed later in this Chapter, many countries highlighted the voluminous
amounts of evidence associated with cybercrime investigations and the time consuming nature of
investigations into reported cases. One country in the Americas, for example, stated that ‘the
complexity of cybercrime offences and cybercrime elements of traditional offences has increased significantly, which places
additional demands for the training and maintenance of highly-skilled investigators and technical experts, and also
increases the amounts of time that need to be spent on individual cases.’21 In many countries, law enforcement
agency capacity is fully occupied with day-to-day cases. In response to questions on law enforcement
capacity for forensic investigations, for example, one country in Africa reported that ‘A few forensic
examiners/investigators are available at the Federal level, but not enough to serve the whole country. Only one
laboratory is functional.’22 Another country in the Americas highlighted that ‘The challenge is not in the
expertise, but the quantity of data that must be analysed.’23 The nature of forensic investigations, and law
enforcement capacity in this area, is discussed in detail in Chapter Six (Electronic evidence and
criminal justice).
In addition to the challenge of capacity and resources, the extent to which proactive
cybercrime investigations can be undertaken by law enforcement may also be affected by underlying
differences between common and civil law systems regarding prosecutorial and judicial oversight
over the initial stages of an investigation,24 as well as the extent to which intrusive investigative
measures can be authorized in intelligence-based or prospective investigations. As discussed in this
Chapter, cybercrime investigations often make use of tools, including interception of
communications and electronic surveillance, which have the potential to infringe upon privacy-based
rights. Countries with international human rights law commitments will need to ensure a
proportionate balance between protection of privacy, and infringements for legitimate crime
prevention and control purposes. The section below on privacy and investigations examines this
area in greater depth.
Nonetheless, law enforcement authorities in developed countries, and also in a number of
developing countries, are engaged in medium and long-term strategic investigations. These often
involve undercover units targeting offenders on social networking sites, chat rooms, and instant
messaging and P2P services. Examples include the infiltration or establishment of online ‘carding’
forums,25 the forensic examination of forums used by child pornography offenders,26 the use of law
enforcement officers posing as minors online,27 and the examination of malware command and
control servers.28 Many of these investigations involve multiple law enforcement agencies and a large
range of investigative measures, including those carried out pursuant to judicial authority, such as
search or interception orders. Indeed, both strategic and tactical investigations require access to a
range of investigative powers, which – in accordance with rule of law principles – must be firmly
grounded in legal authority. The next section of this Chapter examines typical cybercrime
investigative powers found in international and regional instruments, and in national laws.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q84.
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q110.
Ibid.
See, for example, INPROL. 2012. Practitioner’s Guide: Common Law and Civil Law Traditions.
See http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/october/darkmarket_102008 and http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/pressreleases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-24-arrests-in-eight-countries-as-part-ofinternational-cyber-crime-takedown
See https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2csefactsheet2012_0.pdf
See http://cdrc.jhpolice.gov.in/cyber-crime/
See http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January13/GoziVirusDocuments/Kuzmin,%20Nikita%20Complaint.pdf
121
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