CHAPTER SIX: ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE police who handle a large amount of cases.’ Similarly, one country in the Americas highlighted that ‘The challenge is not in the expertise, but in the quantity of data that must be analysed,’17 and another noted that ‘the amount of seized information and data is causing more and more problems for storing and analysis.’18 While some countries reported a federal or centralized capacity of a ‘central [forensics] laboratory and peripherals that are in charge of expert analysis of electronic evidence seized in police investigations’19 others reported using a distributed approach with ‘forensic units throughout the country’20 that ‘conduct electronic forensic examinations with specialized forensic tools…used on networks, computer systems, cellular phones, and storage devices.’21 Many countries, especially developing countries, highlighted a lack of resources for technical forensics equipment and challenges in recruiting personnel with sufficient skills to conduct investigations and process electronic evidence. One country in Africa, for example, stated that ‘A few forensic examiners are available at the Federal level, but not enough to serve the whole country. Only one laboratory is functional.’22 A number of countries reported encountering encryption of data during the course of law enforcement investigations and analysis of electronic evidence. Between around 60 and 80 per cent of countries in all regions, with the exception of Asia and Oceania, reported that electronic evidence was often encrypted by suspects.23 Several countries reported an increase in use of encryption by perpetrators. One country Figure 6:2: Electronic evidence encrypted by suspects observed that ‘depending on the crime type, encryption is becoming Europe (n=20) much more common.’24 This view was not universal however. Asia & Oceania (n=15) One country from Europe, for example, reported that ‘collected Yes Americas (n=12) evidence is very rarely encrypted No compared to the enormous amount of Africa seized data.’25 In addition, it is (n=8) unclear whether the low 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% proportion of encryption Source: Cybercrime study questionnaire. Q112. (n=55) reported by countries in Asia and Oceania is due to differences in underlying use of encryption by suspects, or to capacities of law enforcement to detect and analyse encrypted material. Countries noted that there was ‘no simple way’ to overcome the ‘daunting challenge’ of encryption ‘that requires expert technical assistance and capacity.’26 Several countries indicated that they did not possess the means or tools to address the problem of encryption, without obtaining or seizing keys from the suspect. One country reported, for example, that: ‘If the suspected is arrested or known, then the decryption keys are obtained from the suspect during investigation.’27 Some jurisdictions have legal remedies to compel cooperation.28 If the suspect will not reveal decryption keys, investigators may use a 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q109. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q111. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q112. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in one country in Northern Europe, for example, provides the power to impose a disclosure requirement upon a suspect to divulge the key to protected information in their possession. Failure to comply with a 163

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