organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or (iv) it is
committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.41
The approach contains many important features – including the principle of ‘substantial
effects’ within a state. When it comes to cybercrime acts, however, it may not offer a complete
approach. As discussed in the section on ‘Cybercrime perpetrators’ in Chapter Two (The global
picture) of this Study, there is no reason why ‘organized criminal groups’ should be central to
cybercrime acts.42 In addition, due to the global movement of data in internet transactions, a
transnational ‘dimension’ may arise that does not amount to ‘preparation, planning, direction or
control’ within another state.
An approach for cybercrime is to recognize that the determination of a ‘transnational
dimension’ makes most sense when examined with reference to considerations of (i) jurisdiction; and
(ii) criminal evidence. One method of characterizing any offence, for example, is to differentiate the act
elements of ‘conduct’, ‘circumstance’, and ‘result.’43 Where one or more of these elements occurs in, or
produces substantial effects within,44 another territorial jurisdiction, a ‘transnational dimension’ will
exist. As discussed below, this will, in turn have implications for jurisdictional claims. Under this
approach, a single ‘location’ of a cybercrime offence per se may not be determinable – or, indeed,
relevant. Rather, what matters is the successful identification of elements or substantial effects that
allow a state to establish jurisdiction – subject always to the requirement of a ‘sufficient connection’.
In addition, from a broader perspective, a cybercrime transnational ‘dimension’ may arise
where part of the modus operandi of the offence occurs in another jurisdiction. The mere presence in
extra-territorial servers of computer data related to the offence, for example, might not (depending
upon local law) be sufficient to engage the jurisdiction of the server country. It would, however, be
highly relevant for evidence and the investigative process of any country claiming jurisdiction –
possibly requiring action such as a mutual legal assistance request to the server country. In this
situation, a cybercrime case might also be said to have a transnational ‘dimension’. A high number of
cybercrime cases likely fall within this category. They may not, however, always be characterized as
such – either due to sufficient evidence within the prosecuting jurisdiction, or a failure to identify
extra-territorial evidence in the first place.
Two themes are particularly important when it comes to the extra-territorial ‘evidence’
dimension: (i) the increasing involvement of electronic evidence in all crime types and not just those
falling within the term ‘cybercrime’; and (ii) the increasing use of cloud computing involving
distributed and parallel data storage. In particular, automated dynamic data placement within cloud
services in data centres physically located in different countries may present challenges to the
identification of data ‘location.’45 Following an examination of how international and national
41
42
43
44
45
Organized Crime Convention, Art. 3(2).
Although in practice many may be involved. See Chapter Two (The global picture), Section 2.3 Cybercrime perpetrators, Role of
organized criminal groups.
Fletcher, G., 1978. Rethinking Criminal Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thus, for example, an offence of ‘computer system
interference’ may require the ‘intentional’ (intent) ‘damaging, deleting, altering or suppressing of computer data’ (conduct) ‘seriously
hindering’ (result) the ‘functioning of a computer system’ (circumstance).
Operation of the ‘effects doctrine’ has been argued to represent an extension of the objective territorial principle, in so far as it
does not require an ‘element’ of the offence to be located within the jurisdiction. See, for example, Ahlstrom and Others v Commission
of European Communities [1988] ECR 5193. In the cybercrime context, a review of jurisdictional principles relied upon by national
courts in extra-territorial cases suggests that ‘whichever characterization [objective territoriality or effects doctrine] a municipal court chooses
to rely on, the extent of jurisdiction justified will be the same.’ See Hayashi, M., 2006. Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine?
Jurisdiction and Cyberspace. In: Law 6:284-302, p.285.
See, for example, Peterson, Z.N.J., Gondree, M. and Beverly, R., 2011. A Position Paper on Data Sovereignty: The Importance of
Geolocating Data in the Cloud. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY). For an
188
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents