CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION sufficient, compared with around 67 per cent of countries in Africa, Asia and Oceania. All responding countries from Europe – all except one of which had either signed or ratified the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention – considered their legislation to be sufficient or partly sufficient. Countries that did not consider their legislation to be sufficient for extra-territorial acts cited a number of reasons. Common gaps included either a lack of provisions in criminal codes addressing acts committed outside of the jurisdiction, as Common national bases for jurisdiction in well as, in some cases, the non-applicability of extradition cybercrime cases and mutual legal assistance legislation to cybercrime Territory acts.49  Country responses to the Study questionnaire showed that grounds for jurisdiction in extra-territorial cybercrime cases are primarily based on principles such as territoriality (including as interpreted by the objective territoriality principle and substantial effects doctrine) and the nationality of the offender.50 As such, states generally require some degree of internal effect, such as victimization of nationals or effects or damage within the territory. Respondent countries often reported that if the crime is committed entirely outside of the country, with no effects within the territory, then criminalization and prosecution can be particularly challenging.    Commission of crime partly/wholly on the territory Effects/damages within the territory Computer/programme/data used for the commission of the crime located within the territory Commission on registered ships and aircrafts (including military) Nationality    Active – Offender Habitual residence Passive – Victim Other criteria   State interests are affected Ne bis in idem Using territorial jurisdiction International and regional instruments – All international or regional cybercrime instruments that contain a jurisdiction clause recognize the territorial principle – requiring States parties to exercise jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with the instrument, that is ‘committed’ within the state’s geographical territory.51 Criminal activities on ships and aircrafts are also covered by a number of binding and non-binding instruments.52 In accordance with the objective territoriality principle, many international and regional instruments recognize that is not necessary for all elements of the offence to occur within the territory in order for territorial jurisdiction to apply. The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Explanatory Report, for example, clarifies that under the principle of territoriality, a party would assert territorial jurisdiction if both the person attacking a computer system and the victim system are located within its territory, ‘and where the computer system attacked is within its territory, even if the attacker is not.’53 The COMESA Draft Model Bill includes a provision in the instrument itself on the ‘place 49 50 51 52 53 Ibid. Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q18 and Q19. See, for example, Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 22(1)(a); League of Arab States Convention, Art. 30(1)(a); UN OP-CRC-SC, Art. 4(1); COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 40(a)(1); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Text, Art. 19(a); Commonwealth Model Law, Art. 4(a). See, for example, COMESA Draft Model Bill, Art. 40(b); Commonwealth Model Law, Art. 4(b); Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Art. 22(1)(b), (c); Council of Europe Child Protection Convention, Art. 25(1)(b), (c); ITU/CARICOM/CTU Model Legislative Texts, Art. 19(b); League of Arab States Convention, Arts. 30(1)(b), (c); and United Nations OP-CRC-SC, Art. 4(1). Council of Europe, 2001. Explanatory Report to Convention on Cybercrime. 191

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