CHAPTER TWO: THE GLOBAL PICTURE Indeed, when it comes to estimates of individual botnet size, the common technique of reporting unique zombie IP addresses measured over long periods of time is likely to significantly overestimate the number of infected devices.50 While botnet size measurements remain controversial, evidence suggests that ‘successful’ bot herders typically control groups of infected computers of the order of tens or hundreds of thousands of devices – rather than the frequently reported ‘millions’ of devices.51 On this basis, the total number of large criminal ‘commercial’ botnets globally is likely comparatively small. In addition, however, a much higher number of small, Example of information harvested by botnets: ‘amateur’ botnets, consisting of low zombie ‘Torpig’ populations, may also exist.52  C&C domains controlled by academic researchers for a period of 10 days The harm – Such malicious networks  183,000 zombie devices identified during 10 days. are nonetheless capable of significant harm. Average ‘Live’ zombie population at any one time of During one single 10 day period, a botnet of 49,000. Most zombies likely in Northern Europe and North America around 183,000 zombie devices was found  Victim credentials for 8,300 accounts at 400 different to harvest almost 310,000 items of victim financial institutions sent to C&C server bank account, credit card, and webmail and  Details of 1,700 credit cards sent to C&C server social networking credentials.53 As discussed  298,000 victim usernames and passwords for webmail and in the section in this Chapter on ‘cybercrime social networking sites sent to C&C server perpetrators,’ the potential of botnets to  Sufficient aggregate bandwidth of zombies to launch a massive DDoS attack harvest such information has been instrumental in the development of Source: Stone-Gross et al. cybercrime criminal ‘markets’ based largely on botnet sale and rental.54 As noted in the 2010 UNODC Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, the market in personal information harvested through botnets can be largely divided – with different individuals focused on collecting volumes of financial and identifying information, selling it on, and ‘cashing it out.’55 Content offences Overview – One third to one half of the most common cybercrime acts concern contentrelated offences.56 Content may be regulated by criminal law for a range of reasons, including where contrary to national security, public safety, public order, health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. Globally, information from over 4,600 requests by national authorities for removal of content from Google services shows that a wide range of material is perceived by governments to impinge upon these areas.57 Not all such material may strictly engage the criminal law. Nonetheless, 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 It is likely that IP address based measurements only correspond well to the number of infected devices when reported over short time scales, such as one hour. Unique IP addresses measured over longer periods significantly overestimate the number of devices due to DHCP churn. In one botnet study, 1.25 million unique zombie IP addresses identified over 10 days corresponded only to 183,000 bots according to unique bot-ID (Stone-Gross, B., et al. 2009. Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. In: 16th Annual ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 9-13 November 2009). In addition, zombie counts are affected by the ‘no-see’ time before a device or IP address is considered to no longer be a member of the botnet (see http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Stats/BotCounts). See, for example, http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/waledac_kelihos_botnet_takeover/; http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/The_Lifecycle_of_Peer_to_Peer_Gameover_ZeuS/; StoneGross, B., et al. 2009. Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. CCS ‘09. See, for example, http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/botnets-masses Stone-Gross, B., et al., 2009. Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. CCS ‘09. See, for example, Panda Security, 2010. The Cybercrime Black Market: Uncovered. UNODC, 2010. The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. See above, Section 2.2 The global cybercrime picture, Distribution of cybercrime acts. Data from www.google.com/transparencyreport 35

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