legislation with international instruments for countries in Europe, for example, do not appear to translate directly into high levels of harmonization with countries within the region. International instruments relevant to cybercrime and their influence on national legislation are examined later in this Chapter. Firstly, however, it is important to examine the reasons and rationale behind harmonization of cybercrime legislation. Why harmonize? To avoid criminal safe havens – In the field of cybercrime, as for all transnational crimes, the main advantage of harmonizing criminal law lies in the prevention of cybercrime safe havens for perpetrators. As noted by one respondent country to the Study questionnaire, ‘cybercrime is a global problem, and this makes all countries important to us, in one of several ways… we believe that cooperation with developing countries is important on the basis that cybercrime knows no boundaries.’39 Indeed, out of all transnational crimes, cybercrime likely offers the most direct risk for use of safe havens. Thus, if harmful acts involving the internet are criminalized, for example, in State A, but not in State B, a perpetrator in State B can be free to target victims in State A via the internet. In such cases, State A cannot, on its own, effectively protect against effects from such transnational activities. Even where its criminal law allows the assertion of jurisdiction over the perpetrator in State B, it will still require consent or assistance from B – either regarding the gathering of evidence, or the extradition of the identified perpetrator. In order to protect persons within its own jurisdiction, State B is unlikely to assist where the conduct is not also criminalized in its own country. This principle of dual criminality is central to many forms of international cooperation. It can be found, for example, in multilateral and bilateral extradition treaties, as well as national laws.40 Dual criminality also plays a role in mutual legal assistance, such as requests for interviewing of witnesses, or collection of evidence.41 While not all mutual legal assistance agreements between states include this requirement, many instruments ensure that coercive or intrusive measures, such as search and seizure, or freezing of property, are subject to dual criminality.42 Chapter Seven (International cooperation) examines this area in greater detail. For the purposes of harmonization of cybercrime criminal laws, however, an important point is that dual criminality does not require that the underlying activity be punished by the same type of legal provision. Thus, if State C uses a cyberspecific offence for particular conduct, while State D uses a general offence, both C and D will be able to engage in international cooperation, provided that the essential constituent elements of the offence are comparable under the laws of both states.43 As discussed in Chapter Seven, where states achieve a certain degree of harmonization among their national laws (such as in the European 39 40 41 42 43 Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q17. See, for example, Article 2(1) of the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Extradition, and Article 2 of The London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth. See also Plachta, M., 1989. The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters. In: Agell, A., Bomann, R., and Jareborg, N. (eds.) Double criminality, Studies in international criminal law. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, p.111, referring to, inter alia, Shearer, I., 1971. Extradition in international law. Manchester, p. 137, and Bassiouni, M.C., 1974. International extradition and world public order. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p.325. See Capus, N., 2010. Strafrecht und Souveränität: Das Erfordernis der beidseitigen Strafbarkeit in der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Bern: Nomos, p.406. See, for example, Article 5(1) of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, and Article 18(1)(f) of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. For the exchange of information or other forms of cooperation that do not infringe upon the rights of the person concerned, dual criminality has not been required. See Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W., Ryckman, C., 2012. Rethinking International Cooperation in Criminal Matters in the EU. Antwerp: Maklu, p.133; and Klip, A., 2012. European Criminal Law. Antwerp: Intersentia, p.345. Plachta, M., 1989. The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters. In: Agell, A., Bomann, R., Jareborg, N. (eds.). Double criminality, Studies in international criminal law. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, pp.108-109. See also: Explanatory report to the European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, that specifies in the clarification of Art. 18(1)(f) that dual criminality is required in abstract to for the investigative measures meant by Section 2, which includes (but is not limited to) the investigative measures that require coercive action. 60

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