legislation with international instruments for countries in Europe, for example, do not appear to
translate directly into high levels of harmonization with countries within the region.
International instruments relevant to cybercrime and their influence on national legislation
are examined later in this Chapter. Firstly, however, it is important to examine the reasons and
rationale behind harmonization of cybercrime legislation.
Why harmonize?
To avoid criminal safe havens – In the field of cybercrime, as for all transnational crimes, the
main advantage of harmonizing criminal law lies in the prevention of cybercrime safe havens for
perpetrators. As noted by one respondent country to the Study questionnaire, ‘cybercrime is a global
problem, and this makes all countries important to us, in one of several ways… we believe that cooperation with
developing countries is important on the basis that cybercrime knows no boundaries.’39 Indeed, out of all
transnational crimes, cybercrime likely offers the most direct risk for use of safe havens.
Thus, if harmful acts involving the internet are criminalized, for example, in State A, but not
in State B, a perpetrator in State B can be free to target victims in State A via the internet. In such
cases, State A cannot, on its own, effectively protect against effects from such transnational
activities. Even where its criminal law allows the assertion of jurisdiction over the perpetrator in
State B, it will still require consent or assistance from B – either regarding the gathering of evidence,
or the extradition of the identified perpetrator. In order to protect persons within its own
jurisdiction, State B is unlikely to assist where the conduct is not also criminalized in its own
country. This principle of dual criminality is central to many forms of international cooperation. It can
be found, for example, in multilateral and bilateral extradition treaties, as well as national laws.40
Dual criminality also plays a role in mutual legal assistance, such as requests for interviewing of
witnesses, or collection of evidence.41 While not all mutual legal assistance agreements between
states include this requirement, many instruments ensure that coercive or intrusive measures, such as
search and seizure, or freezing of property, are subject to dual criminality.42 Chapter Seven
(International cooperation) examines this area in greater detail. For the purposes of harmonization of
cybercrime criminal laws, however, an important point is that dual criminality does not require that
the underlying activity be punished by the same type of legal provision. Thus, if State C uses a cyberspecific offence for particular conduct, while State D uses a general offence, both C and D will be
able to engage in international cooperation, provided that the essential constituent elements of the
offence are comparable under the laws of both states.43 As discussed in Chapter Seven, where states
achieve a certain degree of harmonization among their national laws (such as in the European
39
40
41
42
43
Study cybercrime questionnaire. Q17.
See, for example, Article 2(1) of the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, Article 2(1) of the European Convention on
Extradition, and Article 2 of The London Scheme for Extradition within the Commonwealth. See also Plachta, M., 1989. The role
of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters. In: Agell, A., Bomann, R., and Jareborg, N. (eds.) Double
criminality, Studies in international criminal law. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, p.111, referring to, inter alia, Shearer, I., 1971. Extradition in
international law. Manchester, p. 137, and Bassiouni, M.C., 1974. International extradition and world public order. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, p.325.
See Capus, N., 2010. Strafrecht und Souveränität: Das Erfordernis der beidseitigen Strafbarkeit in der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen.
Bern: Nomos, p.406.
See, for example, Article 5(1) of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, and Article 18(1)(f) of the Council
of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. For the exchange of
information or other forms of cooperation that do not infringe upon the rights of the person concerned, dual criminality has not
been required. See Vermeulen, G., De Bondt, W., Ryckman, C., 2012. Rethinking International Cooperation in Criminal Matters in the EU.
Antwerp: Maklu, p.133; and Klip, A., 2012. European Criminal Law. Antwerp: Intersentia, p.345.
Plachta, M., 1989. The role of double criminality in international cooperation in penal matters. In: Agell, A., Bomann, R., Jareborg,
N. (eds.). Double criminality, Studies in international criminal law. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, pp.108-109. See also: Explanatory report to the
European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, that specifies in the clarification of Art.
18(1)(f) that dual criminality is required in abstract to for the investigative measures meant by Section 2, which includes (but is not
limited to) the investigative measures that require coercive action.
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