CHAPTER THREE: LEGISLATION AND FRAMEWORKS Union), the principle of dual criminality may come to be replaced by a default presumption of equivalence of laws.44 To enable global evidence collection – The harmonization of procedural law is a second indispensable requirement for effective international cooperation. In the above example, if State B does not have the necessary procedural power for expedited preservation of computer data, for instance, then State A will not be able to request this facility through mutual legal assistance. In other words, a requested state can only provide assistance within its territory, to the extent that it could do so for an equivalent national investigation.45 Again, as with dual criminality, the legal form of the procedural power need not be directly equivalent, as long as the investigative measure can be executed in practice. Securing expedited preservation of data, for example, might legitimately be achieved either through a dedicated order, or a general power of search and seizure. To express ‘seriousness’ and to reduce ��penalty havens’ – From an international cooperation perspective, penalties specified for criminal offences do not strictly require harmonization on the same grounds as for substantive criminal law and the coercive powers of criminal procedural law. Dual criminality does not concern the respective sanctions. Nonetheless, there is a special nexus between cooperation and the level of punishment. The penalties assigned to a crime are indicative of the level of seriousness of the offence. At the international level, the Organized Crime Convention, for example, defines ‘serious crime’ as conduct constituting an offence ‘punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.’46 Given the significant investment that international cooperation requires of States, many extradition instruments specify a threshold of seriousness for the crime involved – usually expressed with reference to the possible penalty that the offence may attract.47 Seriousness thresholds also represent an important mechanism for the protection of the principle of proportionality and the rights of the accused.48 Similar requirement may also apply in some agreements on mutual legal assistance.49 Typical penalty thresholds found in international cooperation instruments range from six to one year,51 or four years.52 During information gathering for the Study, countries were asked about penalties that applied to a range of cybercrime acts, including acts against the months,50 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 See De Bondt, W., 2012. Need for and feasibility of an EU offence policy. Antwerp: Maklu, pp. 46-47. It is not usually explicitly stated in instruments governing mutual assistance that measures which do not exist in the requested state should nonetheless be executed. For coercive measures, however, the draft European Investigation Order states that alternative measures can and should be used when the requested measure does not exist under the law of the requested state. See Council of Europe. 2011. Initiative for a Directive regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters – Text agreed as general approach, 18918/11, 21 December 2011, pp.19-20. Organized Crime Convention, Art. 2. The four year threshold is used to define a general category of ‘serious crime’ to which the Convention applies (which also must be transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group). The threshold does not apply to the specific offences also established in the Convention. Schwaighofer, K., Ebensperger S., 2001. Internationale Rechtshilfe in strafrechtlichen Angelegenheiten. Vienna: WUV Universitätsverlag, p. 8. Lagodny, O. 2012. In: Schomburg, W., Lagodny, O., Gless, S., Hackner, T. (eds.) Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Munich: C.H.Beck, p.90 § 3 IRG, at 23; Murschetz, V. 2007. Auslieferung und Europäischer Haftbefehl. Vienna/New York: Springer, p.124. Article 5(1)(b) of the Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, for example, provides that any contracting party may require an extraditable offence in order to execute letters rogatory for search or seizure of property. Article 2(1) of the Convention on Extradition of the European Union provides that an offence is extraditable if it is punishable by deprivation of liberty of at least one year under the law of the requesting state and at least six months in the requested state. Note, however, that the Convention has been largely replaced by the European Arrest Warrant (Hackner, T., 2012. In:, Schomburg, W., Lagodny, O., Gless, S., Hackner, T. (eds.) Internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Munich: C.H.Beck. p.1174, III A, at 3, and pp.11781179, III A 1, at 9). The extradition provisions of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, for example, apply to criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 to 11 of the Convention, provided that they are punishable under the laws of both parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of at least one year, or by a more severe penalty. Organized Crime Convention, Arts. 2 and 16. 61

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