A/76/135 (a) Putting in place at the national level comprehensive, transparent, objective and impartial frameworks and mechanisms for supply chain risk management, consistent with a State’s international obligations. Such frameworks may include risk assessments that take into account a variety of factors, including the benefits and risks of new technologies. (b) Establishing policies and programmes to objectively promote the adoption of good practices by suppliers and vendors of ICT equipment and systems in order to build international confidence in the integrity and security of ICT products and services, enhance quality and promote choice. (c) Increased attention in national policy and in dialogue with States and relevant actors at the United Nations and other fora on how to ensure all States can compete and innovate on an equal footing, so as to enable the full realization of ICTs to increase global social and economic development and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, while also safeguarding national security and the public interest. (d) Cooperative measures such as exchanges of good practices at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels on supply chain risk management; developing and implementing globally interoperable common rules and standards for supply chain security; and other approaches aimed at decreasing supply ch ain vulnerabilities. 58. To prevent the development and proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions, including backdoors, States can consider putting in place at the national level: (a) Measures to enhance the integrity of the supply chain, including by requiring ICT vendors to incorporate safety and security in the design, development and throughout the lifecycle of ICT products. To this end, States may also consider establishing independent and impartial certification processes. (b) privacy. Legislative and other safeguards that enhance the protection of data and (c) Measures that prohibit the introduction of harmful hidden functions and the exploitation of vulnerabilities in ICT products that may compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems and networks, including in critical infrastructure. 59. In addition to the steps and measures outlined above, States should continue to encourage the private sector and civil society to play an appropriate role to improve the security of and in the use of ICTs, including supply chain security for ICT products, and thus contribute to meeting the objectives of this norm. Norm 13 (j) States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share associated information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities to limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent infrastructure. 60. This norm reminds States of the importance of ensuring that ICT v ulnerabilities are addressed quickly in order to reduce the possibility of exploitation by malicious actors. Timely discovery and responsible disclosure and reporting of ICT vulnerabilities can prevent harmful or threatening practices, increase trust and confidence, and reduce related threats to international security and stability. 61. Vulnerability disclosure policies and programmes, as well as related international cooperation, aim to provide a reliable and consistent process to routinize such disclosures. A coordinated vulnerability disclosure process can minimize the harm to society posed by vulnerable products and systematize the reporting of ICT 21-04030 15/26

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