A/76/136 normal course of events would have become aware that its territory was being used for harmful cyber operations. 197 This implies that the criterion that a State ‘should have known’ is more likely to be met if for instance the operation used publicly known and easily detected malware, as opposed to highly sophisticated and previously unknown malware. There is currently no legal basis for a general obligation to prevent cyber operations, and States are consequently not under an obligation to monitor all cyber activities on their territories. 198 Norway considers the due diligence obligation to be of particular importance in a cyber context. In situations where a targeted State cannot directly attribute (technically and legally) a wrongful cyber operation – for instance election interference – to the State from whose territory it is being carried out, the territorial State may nevertheless still be held accountable on the basis of a breach of the due diligence obligation. Response measures 5 The response measures an injured State may take under international law depend on the severity and nature of the cyber operation and on whether the legally responsible actor behind it is another State or a non-State actor. 5.1 Retorsion A State may respond to any form of cyber operation by retorsion. Retorsion refers to the taking of measures that are lawful but unfriendly, directed against another State. Retorsion may therefore be used regardless of whether international law has been violated and regardless of whether State responsibility applies. Examples of acts of retorsion are breaking off or limiting diplomatic relations, for instance by declaring a diplomat persona non grata, or the imposition of sanctions. Publicly declaring that another State is responsible for a cyber operation is in itself an act of retorsion. 5.2 Countermeasures If a State is the victim of an internationally wrongful cyber operation and another State can be held responsible under customary international law on State responsibility, the injured State may, depending on the circumstances, be entitled to take countermeasures. A countermeasure is an act that would otherwise be contrary to international law, but where the injured State can invoke the prior internationally wrongful act 199 as a ground for precluding wrongfulness. 200 If there is doubt regarding the attribution of a cyber operation to a State under international law, it may be preferable for the injured State to make use of acts of retorsion rather than countermeasures in order to avoid the possibility of incurring State responsibility for its response. Countermeasures may only be taken to induce a State to cease an internationally wrongful act or resume its compliance with an international obligation. They are not to be used for punishment and retaliation. Countermeasures must be limited to what is considered necessary and proportional, and may only target the State to which the __________________ 197 198 199 200 72/142 See also Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to Rule 6, p. 41. A general obligation of full control and prevention in the cyber context could be problematic in relation to a State’s obligations under international human rights law. In this document, ‘internationally wrongful acts’ must be understood as including both actions and omissions, see Articles 1 and 2 ILC ASR. See Articles 22 and 49–54 ILC ASR. 21-09670

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