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Attestation and Privacy
Consider a device communicating with a server that wants
assurance of the device’s identity, i.e. the server wants the
device to authenticate itself. However, the device (more
specifically, its user) may want privacy and therefore may
require that the server only learns that the device is
trusted. In principle, the problem could be solved by
embedding a single secret key in every device and in the
server, or using public-key cryptography with a single private
key across all devices and a public key in the server.
However, if any one device were compromised and the
secret key extracted and published, the server would no
longer be able to distinguish between real devices and
fake ones.
Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID210 (EPID) is an enhancement of
DAA that allows revocation of a private key given a signature
created by that key, even if the key itself is still unknown.
Also, each private key is actually a large set of key values,
and a device can use a different key value in every
transaction. This prevents anyone – including the
manufacturer, the verifier, and the certificate authority –
from tracing the key back to the root key or from identifying
multiple transactions as emanating from the same device.
EPID is the basis of Secure Device Onboard211 (SDO), a
service developed by Intel that securely brings IoT devices
online in an automated manner. SDO attests the device and
connects it to the owner's IoT platform, and is supported by
several IoT platform providers including AWS and Google.
To address this, TCG initially proposed an intermediate
certification authority called the Privacy CA, which has the
obvious drawback that the Privacy CA 208 needs to be
involved in every transaction and thus must be highly
available and yet as secure as an ordinary CA that normally
operates online. The newer Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) scheme is a digital signature algorithm supporting
anonymity, allowing devices to uniquely authenticate
themselves without the need for a Privacy CA . Unlike
traditional digital signing, in which an entity has a public
verification key corresponding to a single private signing
key, DAA provides a common group public verification key
associated with many unique private signing keys. DAA
was created so that a device could prove its membership
of a trusted group to an external party without needing to
provide device identity. The DAA scheme was adopted by
TCG as part of TPM 1.2.209
Firmware and Secure Boot
When power is first switched on, a device is relatively
dumb and can read only part of its storage called read-only
memory (ROM) or firmware. For complex devices, the
firmware (called Basic Input-Output System, or BIOS)
typically initiates a multi-step procedure, calling code at the
Master Boot Record (MBR) which in turn calls a bootloader
to run a larger program such as an operating system. An
alternative to BIOS is offered by the Unified Extensible
Firmware Interface (UEFI); modern versions of Linux and
Windows support UEFI with BIOS backward compatibility.212
208 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Anonymous_Attestation
209 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/
210 https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/whitepapers/intel-epid-iot-security-white-paper.pdf
Simpler embedded devices often have (minimal) software
systems entirely in ROM firmware or flash memory; little or
no loading is necessary. Some designs may use an
intermediate technique where minimal bootloader-like code
is loaded into device RAM by the integrated boot ROM.213
211 https://www.intel.sg/content/www/xa/en/internet-of-things/secure-deviceonboard.html
212 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface
213 https://www.embedded.com/design/mcus-processors-and-socs/4008796/2/
Fundamentals-of-Booting-for-Embedded-Processors
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