Chapter 4 Ransomware risk to national security | CSAN 2021 Figure 1: The ransomware kill chain Obtaining initial access Consolidating position Siphoning-off information Diversification and specialisation can also be seen here. Each step in this ransomware kill chain has specialists who either offer this as a service or cooperate with other specialists to carry out highly effective combined attacks. Here, too, clear cost-benefit considerations apply. In a targeted attack, factors considered in determining a ransom demand include the effort required to penetrate and gain control of a network, the risks to the attacker of being discovered, the capital strength of the victim and the extent to which business continuity and/or sensitive data play an important role for the victim. Moreover, the higher the general willingness of victims to pay, the higher the demands will be. The Police also note that an appropriate portion of the ransom paid by victims is directly invested in new attack infrastructures, and thus in attacking new victims. Ransomware-as-a-Service: a plague for SMEs The majority of ransomware attacks are characterised as RaaS. Ransomware developers found this to be a way to spread their malware on a large scale without running any risks themselves. RaaS offers the customers of this product the opportunity to apply ransomware to networks or systems even without significant programming skills. These customers, also known as affiliates, fall into the dependent perpetrators category. For each successful ransomware attack, they pay the ransomware developer a fixed, agreed percentage of the ransom paid. The victims of these mostly indiscriminate attacks are generally small to medium-sized enterprises and increasingly public institutions such as local authorities. These are victims with generally low to limited digital resilience, where relatively little time and effort needs to be invested by the attacker. In April 2020, Help Net Security estimated, following a survey of more than 500 executives within international SMEs, that 46% of SMEs had, at some time, been victims of ransomware. Deployment of ransomware Financial settlement Big Game Hunting: customisation for maximum yield These are targeted attacks on large organisations, whereby customised attacks are carried out in order to achieve maximum financial gain. It is mainly autonomous groups - often Eastern European - that (are able to) carry out such attacks. Ransomware is often 'just' a part of a process with several combined attack techniques. In this process, different groups, each with their own specialisation, often work together, which significantly increases the threat. The Emotet botnet, for example, which was taken down by the Police and the Public Prosecution Service in 2021, infected more than a million systems worldwide with attack methods that were not very sophisticated. In many cases, computers were infected with spam without being targeted. This was possible because the investigation revealed that victims' often low level of digital resilience could be exploited to the full. A striking example: finding two-factor authentication on a system was already a reason not to continue the attack. The next steps in the attack process were often targeted and advanced. The group behind Emotet manifested itself as a service provider by reselling access to networks within a select customer base. Somewhere in this process, a form of triage also took place, whereby the wealthiest networks were ranked higher. The customers, in the sense of other autonomous groups, could then install their additional malware or have it installed. For example TrickBot, which was used to consolidate the position and steal information. Ultimately, using Ryuk ransomware, actors were able to target ransomware on these networks at strategic locations, where they were able to make a realistic assessment of what the maximum ransom demand could be. The publication or threat of publishing the previously stolen data could serve as an additional means of applying pressure. Investigations reveal that such cooperation is becoming increasingly complex. An attack on a network can therefore involve different actors, who take on different roles, whereby the distinction between perpetrating acts and providing services becomes significantly blurred. Also, actors can choose different malware families in different circumstances, in a plug-and-play manner. This makes its detection, but also its mitigation, particularly complex. 29

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