NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021 managing risks are: identification of relevant risks, prevention by implementing measures, detection of repulsed and successful attacks, mitigation of the impact of a successful attack, and repair to restore full operation of a process. Communication with stakeholders, including feedback to management, plays an important role in evaluating the effectiveness of the process. In addition to the aforementioned activities, overarching aspects are increasingly evident in a broader view of risk management. Regulation from the market and government - such as insurance, certification and liability - plays an increasingly important role. This also applies to governance, realistic testing, situational awareness and learning from mistakes. These different facets of risk management should reinforce each other: risk management is a continuous process with the aim of ensuring that risks are clearly and unambiguously identified and actually reduced. Resilience is a team effort Traditionally, the management of technology-related risks has been entrusted to the ICT department. This widens the gap between technical experts and the business. Instead, risk management can be seen as a team affair. Management of cyber risks should be done in consultation with the business, involving parties such as business continuity managers, risk managers, process owners and domain experts. Examples of where this has not happened show that basic problems can otherwise fall between two stools. Furthermore, in addition to the importance of good cooperation between disciplines, cooperation between the different layers of an organisation is essential. The exploration and management of strategic, tactical and operational risks should be well coordinated. Scenarios provoke thought ‘Prevention and cure’ as an adage A balanced approach to cyber risks is not just about reacting to incidents or rolling out measures to stop attacks. Instead, a nuanced view of the problem is needed. It must be accepted that there is no such thing as airtight security and that there will always be successful attacks. This does not mean that digital dyke reinforcement is of no use. Such activities can indeed help to parry attacks and reduce the impact of successful attacks. Detecting attackers at an early stage and responding quickly, can limit the damage. At the other end of the spectrum, the 'security by design' and 'privacy by design' mentality can also be used. The earlier security issues are included in the development process of a process, system or service, the cheaper and/or the more impactful the measures taken will normally be. The challenge is to find the right balance in this playing field so that risks can be addressed at an acceptable cost, both in terms of money and in terms of balancing other interests such as freedom, accessibility and progress. The 'usable security' field shows that interests do not have to be mutually exclusive. If problems are identified in good time in consultation with end users, there is a good chance that an appropriate trade-off can be made. Basic principles can be applied widely Although the establishment of a comprehensive risk management system in a large organisation may take several years, the underlying principles are also relevant for smaller organisations. After all, risk management can be implemented in many different ways. It is mainly a question of seeing what works in the given context. Therefore, each organisation is free to design its own approach to risk management in line with existing obligations. The following fundamental principles may be helpful in this regard. 44 Risks often remain abstract. For this reason, it may be useful to translate them into scenarios. Examples of such scenarios are included in Chapter 8, Threat Scenarios. This kind of scenariodriven way of working makes things tangible, and it makes it easier to build bridges between different disciplines. A workshop to introduce people to scenarios could start with everyday examples, such as ways of breaking into a house. Based on these relatively simple scenarios, more complex examples can be given, such as scenarios involving cybercrime. In a next step, even the perspectives of different disciplines could be added. Apart from being used for risk identification, these scenarios can also be used during the other stages of the risk management cycle. They can be used, for example, in process audits, system testing and incident response exercises. Money and uptime are universal benchmarks In order to be able to compare different scenarios, it is important to agree on a common interpretation of the concept of risk and to use the same indicators for multiple risk analyses. This allows risks to be compared in an informed way. An example of a set of indicators that is fairly universal is money (or financial impact) and continuity (or availability). By also using these indicators for other types of risks, cyber risks can be put on the same footing as, for example, operational risks. In this way, the crown jewels of an organisation can be identified by looking at what has the most impact on revenue and business continuity. These crown jewels can then be given extra attention, and the security budget can be used intelligently. In this way, the parts of an organisation that actually need it are made more resilient. Unfortunately, however, there are also organisations that carry out risk analyses that leave something to be desired: risks are often vaguely and sweepingly described, so that they cannot be adequately explained. This makes it more difficult to weigh up the effectiveness of measures to protect the performance of a country or organisation's core tasks. Security is then quickly seen as a cost item instead of an integral part of business operations.

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