Chapter 2 Retrospective | CSAN 2021 2 Retrospective In the period from March 2020 to March 2021, numerous cyber incidents occurred in or in relation to the Netherlands, with both intentional and unintentional causes. None of these incidents led to social disruption. The impact of incidents varied widely, from a brief interruption of processes to the need to rebuild parts of the technical infrastructure. Cyber incidents not only have an impact on direct victims, but also on (chains of) suppliers, customers and members of the public who use the services of (public) organisations. In public organisations, there is no choice of service for members of the public, but rather a dependency relationship. In a number of incidents, the interests of individual and sometimes vulnerable members of the public have been affected, such as when personal data has been stolen. The following are recurring themes in an open source summary of incidents: COVID-19 as an opportunity for malicious actors; targeting facilities for remote working; deliberately denying access to processes; attacks on organisations in supply chains; data breaches, and finally, process outages. The Retrospective chapter is structured around these themes and provides concrete examples of incidents that have occurred. 2.1 COVID-19 an opportunity for malicious actors The global COVID-19 pandemic strongly influences the Retrospective. The pandemic was and is being exploited by malicious actors. For example, state actors have used digital espionage activities in their search for information on medical knowledge and policy follow-up on COVID-19. These include research data on treatment, test results and vaccines, information on the estimated spread of infection and possible policy strategies. Criminals are exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic for attacks through phishing, ransomware and distribution of malicious apps. They are increasing the pressure to pay ransom by launching ransomware attacks on the processes of organisations that are crucial in the fight against COVID-19, including patient care facilities, medical suppliers and laboratories. For example, the Dutch healthcare sector was advised by Z-CERTII in close cooperation with the NCSC following a ransomware attack on a medical supplier. The need in society for information and financial support under COVID-19 has been exploited frequently in phishing campaigns as a stepping stone for attacks. These were often preexisting malware campaigns in which the theme of emails, malicious attachments and links were adapted to COVID-19. In the Netherlands, for example, SMS phishing (smishing) has been observed, in which malicious parties pretend to be the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). According to Z-CERT, the effect of the phishing campaigns in the Dutch healthcare sector has been limited. Finally, the hacking of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in December 2020 showed that both medical knowledge and information on policy monitoring had been misused in a disinformation campaign. II Z-CERT has been designated as the computer emergency response team for the entire healthcare sector (Network and Information Systems Security Act) since January 2020. 17

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