Chapter 8 Threat scenarios | CSAN 2021
Further (forensic) investigation is being conducted by
Cirrocumulus Networks and a forensic investigation company hired
by an affected customer. This reveals that the intrusion can be
traced back to the temporary re-routing of the direct connection by
NLeX a few weeks earlier when a storm caused a system failure that
made NLeX's service temporarily unavailable. When NLeX
temporarily switched the direct peering connection of a number of
Cirrocumulus Networks customers to an internet connection, a
(human) error was made in the confusing, time-sensitive situation,
which led to a vulnerability. A malicious actor had surreptitiously
exploited this vulnerability, as the malware found in a customer
environment appears to have been installed since the time of the
extreme weather situation. As more customers may have been
affected, Cirrocumulus Networks is notifying all its customers in
the affected region as a precaution.
Key term
(Private) peering connection: a method of routing traffic between
devices in two different networks without having to use a third party
(ISP) to route the traffic. For example, large organisations use
private peering connections to exchange data between different
locations in their organisation. For communication with other
organisations, organisations use a public peering connection,
usually through an ISP that in turn has peering connections with
other ISPs. Peering connections between ISPs are often realised in
an Internet Exchange. The interconnection of all peering
connections forms the Internet.
Key questions for the reader
It appears that several, but not all, Cirrocumulus Networks
customers who were temporarily switched from a direct
connection to an internet connection by NLeX during the storm
have indeed experienced suspicious activity. There is still much
uncertainty about the exact scope of the data that has been stolen,
but it is clear that in addition to personal (customer) information,
the data of some customers also includes business-sensitive
information and sensitive information from some government
departments. This information is additional fuel on the fire in the
(social) media. Varying speculation from cybersecurity experts
make it unclear which organisations have been affected, which
have not, and what the consequences of the succession of
incidents are. Questions are also asked in Parliament, such as
whether the Netherlands has become too dependent on cloud
services and whether customers using the services of the CSP, the
cloud exchange or the CSP itself are responsible for the damage
suffered.
1. Do you have monitoring and detection capacity available or
purchased as a service? Are you aware of what exactly is being
monitored and what types of threats are and are not being
detected?
2. How are the responsibilities allocated between you as the
customer and the cloud service provider in the event of an
incident? What are the individual and collective
responsibilities in this regard? And are they sufficiently
coordinated with each other?
3. Are you familiar with or do you use an assume breach strategy?
In other words: if it is assumed that your organisation will one
day be confronted with a cybersecurity incident, what is your
action framework?
Scenario part c: operation dust cloud leads to scorched earth
Description of events
Interpretation
Many organisations see moving operations to a public or hybrid
cloud environment as a way to increase protection against cyber
attacks. For cloud service providers, it is extremely important to
ensure the security of their services, and they therefore have a lot of
expertise and capacity in the field of cybersecurity. However, this
does not mean that cloud environments are infallible. Mistakes can
be made and malicious actors are lurking everywhere to exploit
vulnerabilities.
Incidents such as Solarwinds have shown that organisations can be
vulnerable if they depend on an increasingly complex network of
software product suppliers or outsourced ICT services.
Organisations do not always have a good overview of all the parties
that are part of this network, which makes control difficult. An
attack on a component in the chain of ICT services can therefore
indirectly impact an organisation (supply chain attack, see also the
threat scenario of CSAN 2020).
A large group of Dutch customers of CSP Cirrocumulus Networks
suddenly have no access to their cloud environment. Media reports
immediately point to a major infrastructure failure at Cirrocumulus
Networks and do not exclude the possibility of an attack. It is of
note that this occurs at a time when reports of suspicious activity in
the cloud environment of several Cirrocumulus Networks
customers have already come to light. A spokesperson for
Cirrocumulus Networks indicates that service was indeed disrupted
by problems in one of its data centres and that they are working to
find the cause and solution. Meanwhile, unrest among
Cirrocumulus Networks customers is growing, fuelled by media
reports. Are their systems and data still reliable and secure? What's
going on?
A few hours later, Cirrocumulus announces that there is an
advanced attack against one of the company’s data centres in the
Netherlands, which has affected some of the Dutch customers. The
situation is now under control and Cirrocumulus Networks is doing
everything possible to restore service as soon as possible. This can
take from a few hours to a few weeks, depending on the specific
situation of the affected users.
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