Civil Nuclear Cyber Security Strategy 2022 significant impacts – from reputational, financial and operational implications, all the way to severe safety and security outcomes. This is increasingly the case as IT and OT systems become more interconnected. • And finally, increasing the sector’s technical maturity alone will not deliver good cyber security: in considering what good looks like the importance of strategic enablers such as leadership, governance and competence must be recognised. As part of this, each partner – industry, ONR, supply chain, the NCSC and BEIS – should take responsibility for those issues where it is uniquely placed to take action. Building on existing frameworks for cyber security maturity such as the ONR’s Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) 8 and the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) 9, we have developed a high-level model of good civil nuclear cyber security. These outcomes outline what we want to achieve across all civil nuclear organisations, domains and systems (Figure 6). In support of this model, a maturity framework was commissioned by BEIS, with the support of funding from the National Cyber Security Programme, to articulate some of these outcomes in more detail, in particular the indicators of good practice in cyber risk mitigation. The maturity framework was designed to be aligned with both the SyAPs and CAF, and outlined measurable goals against the indicators set out in Figure 7. Our intention is to use this framework as an objective assessor of cyber security maturity over time. Over the next five years this strategy will prioritise action and investment where there is a clear priority or gap. However, we recognise that new capabilities and challenges will arise over the life of the strategy. We will therefore regularly monitor and evaluate sector maturity against these indicators, enabling us to measure progress and redirect attention if priorities need to be adjusted. Figure 6 – An overview of the CAF-aligned sector maturity framework used for the Benchmarking Project OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLE A1 Governance A: Managing Security Risk A2 Risk Management A3 Asset Management A4 Supply Chain B1 Service Protection Policies and Processes B: Protecting Against Cyber Attack B2 Identity and Access Control B3 Data Security B4 System Security B5 Resilient Networks and Systems B6 Staff Awareness and Training 8 9 C: Detecting Cyber Security Events C1 Security Monitoring D: Minimising the Impact of Cyber Security Incidents D1 Response and Recovery Planning C2 Proactive Security Event Discovery D2 Lessons Learned Office for Nuclear Regulation’s Security Assessment Principles (SyAPs) Framework UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Guidance 15

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