18. Warren Harrison, George Heuston, Mark
Morrissey, Aucsmith & Sarah Mocas, “A
Lesson Learned Repository for Computer
Forensics,” International Journal of Digital
Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 3 (2002).
19. Ruibin & Gaertner, supra § 2 C, note 32.
20. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1
B, note 1.
21. Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 171.
22. Regarding the challenges of encryption,
see § 1 D; see also Siegfried, supra note
17.
23. Regarding possible counter strategies for
law enforcement, see J. Alex Halderman,
Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger et al.,
Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks
on Encryption Keys, Proc. 17th USENIX
Security Symposium, (San Jose, CA,
Jul. 2008), at http://citp.princeton.edu/
memory.
24. Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at 88.
25. Vaciago, supra § 2 C, note 33.
26. See Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 44, at 43;
Robert Moore, “To View or Not to View:
Examining the Plain View Doctrine and
Digital Evidence,” American Journal of
Criminal Justice, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004), p.
59.
27. Moore, ibid., at 58.
28. Lange & Nimsger, supra § 2 C, note 14, at
6; Gary Gordon, Chet Hosmer, Christine
Siedsma & Don Rebovich, Assessing
Technology, Methods, and Information for
Committing and Combating Cyber Crime,
(Washingtong, DC: US Dept. of Justice,
Jan. 2003), p. 38, at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/198421.pdf.
29. Ibid.
30. Consider, for instance, the issue of the FBI
attempting to unlock a recovered Apple
iPhone. See supra § 1 B, case 1.3.
31. Casey, supra note 17.
32. Lange & Nimsger, supra § 2 C, note 16, at
473; Gordon et al., supra note 28; Marco
Gercke, “Challenges Related to the Fight
against Cybercrime,” Multimedia und
Recht, (2008), p. 297.
33. See, e.g., Vindu Goel, “Encryption Is
More Important, and Easier, Than Ever
By,” New York Times, (14 Oct. 2015), at
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/
encryption-is-more-important-and-easierthan-ever/?_r=0.
Page 152 | Chapter 2 | End Notes
34. Siegfried, supra note 17. Regarding
the decryption process in forensic
investigations, see Gordon et al., supra
note 28, at 59.
35. Ibid. Regarding the forensic software
magic lantern, developed as a keylogger
used by law enforcement in the United
States, see Christopher Woo and Miranda
So, “The Case for Magic Lantern,
Highlights the Need for Increased
Surveillance,” Harvard Journal of Law &
Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2002), p. 521
et seq.; Spyware: Background and Policy
issues for Congress, US Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report, (2007),
p. 3; Thomas Green, “FBI Magic Lantern
reality check,” Register, (12 Mar. 2001),
at www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/03/
fbi_magic_lantern_reality_check/; Alex
Salkever, “A Dark Side to the FBI’s Magic
Lantern,” Bloomberg, (27 Nov. 2001),
at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2001-11-26/a-dark-side-to-thefbis-magic-lantern; Bob Sullivan, “FBI
Software Cracks Encryption Wall,” NBC
News, (20 Nov. 2001), at http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/3341694/ns/technology_
and_science-security/t/fbi-softwarecracks-encryption-wall; Elinor Abreu, “FBI
Confirms ‘Magic Lantern’ Project Exists,”
Rense, (13 Dec. 2001), at http://www.
rense.com/general17/FBIconfirmsmagic.
htm.
36. See infra § 3 B for discussion informal
international cooperation encouraging
information sharing and coordination
centers.
37. Regarding the plans of German lawenforcement agencies to develop
a software to remotely access a
suspect’s computer and perform search
procedures, see John Blau, “Debate
Rages over German Government Spyware
Plan,” Infoworld, (5 Sep. 2007), at http://
www.infoworld.com/article/2649377/
security/debate-rages-over-germangovernment-spyware-plan.html; Anne
Broache, “Germany Wants to Sic Spyware
on Terror Suspects,” CNet News, (31 Aug.
2007), at https://www.cnet.com/news/
germany-wants-to-sic-spyware-on-terrorsuspects.
38. Erin Kenneally, “Confluence of Digital
Evidence and the Law: On the Forensic
Soundness of Live-Remote Digital
Evidence Collection,” UCLA Journal of
Law & Technology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2005).
39. See Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 42, at 52.
41. Kerr, supra note 17, at p. 538.
42. “Computer Forensics Tool Testing
Project,” National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), at http://www.cftt.
nist.gov.
43. Moore, supra note 26, at 58.
44. See Casey, supra § 2 C, note 49, at 16;
Vacca, supra § 2 C, note 44, at 39.
45. Chet Hosmer, “Proving the Integrity of
Digital Evidence with Time,” International
Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1,
No. 1 (2001), p. 1, at www.utica.edu/
academic/institutes/ecii/publications/
articles/9C4EBC25-B4A3-6584-C38C5
11467A6B862.pdf.
46. Whitcomb, supra note 13.
47. Regarding the related procedural
instrument, see Art. 19.3, Budapest
Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32.
48. The bit-streaming method consecutively
duplicates digital data in its minimum
unit–bit. This method enables replication
of all data, including those hidden or
deleted from the original storage device.
49. Korea: “Rule on the Collection and
Analysis of Evidence by Digital Forensic
Investigator,” at http://www.law.go.kr/
main.html (in Korean).
50. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1
B, note 1, at 251–79.
51. See Nolan et al., supra § 2 C, note 42, at
12.
52. Tom Talleur, “Digital Evidence: The Moral
Challenge,” International Journal of
Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2002),
p. 1 et seq., at https://www.utica.edu/
academic/institutes/ecii/publications/
articles/9C4E398D-0CAD-4E8DCD2D38F31AF079F9.pdf; Eoghan Casey,
“Error, Uncertainty, and Loss in Digital
Evidence,” International Journal of
Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (2002), at
www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/
publications/articles/A0472DF7-ADC97FDE-C80B5E5B306A85C4.pdf.
53. See UNODC Cybercrime Study, supra §
2 C, note 42, at 39 et seq.; Nolan et al.,
supra § 2 C, note 42, at 85; Gordon, supra
note 28, at 41 et seq.
54. Ruibin & Gaertner, supra note 13.
55. Gordon, supra note 28, at 62.
40. See, e.g., “About Us,” American Board of
Criminalistics, at http://www.criminalistics.
com/.
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