of countries base their mutual legal assistance (MLA) regimes on the principle of dual criminality (see section 2 A, above).2 This means that, outside of mechanisms created by instruments such as the Budapest Convention (discussed below), if the “criminal” act for which the MLA request is only criminalized in one country that has acceded to the mutual legal assist stance treaty (MLAT), then the country being requested to provide assistance may not be authorized to do so. Formal international cooperation aims at addressing three basic problems: 1  Gap-fill national criminal laws that are either incomplete (insofar as they do not deal with cybercrime) or that do not contemplate the kind of cross-border cooperation so often required in combatting cybercrime; 2  Proffer procedural powers where nations are not appropriately equipped to combat cybercrime; and 3  Create enforceable MLA provisions that would facilitate and expedite sharing and assistance in cybercrime matters.3 Effectively fighting cybercrime requires addressing each of these three areas, which demands both efforts at the national level, in developing an appropriate legal framework, and, at the international level, in creating mechanisms for the interoperability of those national frameworks. Failing to address both dimensions could result in the creation of safe havens for cybercriminals.4 Formal international measures, mainly in the form of treaties, attempt to address these concerns by getting states to agree on how to address all of these issues. Where cybercrimes are concerned, complete jurisdiction—that is, over the crime, the evidence and the alleged perpetrators (see section 2 E, above)—is frequently not obtained; as such, states must act beyond their territorial borders and, very frequently, cooperate with others in order to investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. Actions taken through the mechanisms of multilateral instruments, rather than by unilateral effort, are the most effective and important means of establishing extra-territorial jurisdiction over cybercrimes. Once a state has developed the appropriate legal framework for combatting cybercrime (see section 3 A, above), international cooperation is necessary to expand national territorially-based purview and to gap-fill, thereby building effective networks of interoperability that can function coherently and cohesively. That said, even where such formal instruments exist, effective implementation largely depends upon developing informal international relations, typically through additional mechanisms and interactions (see section 5 B, below). Formal and informal modes of cooperation facilitate state consent for conducting foreign law enforcement investigations that affect a state’s sovereignty. For example, law enforcement might access data stored extraterritorially where investigators use an existing live connection from a suspect’s device, or where they use (lawfully-obtained) data-access credentials. Investigators may, on occasion, obtain data from extraterritorial ISPs through an informal direct request, although ISPs usually require due legal process (see section 2 C, case 2.11). Page 195 | Chapter 5 | § A. Multilateral Instruments & Cross-border Cooperation Table of Contents

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