L 333/104
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
27.12.2022
(121) The processing of personal data, to the extent necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring security of
network and information systems by essential and important entities, could be considered to be lawful on the basis
that such processing complies with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, in accordance with the
requirements of Article 6(1), point (c), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Processing of personal data
could also be necessary for legitimate interests pursued by essential and important entities, as well as providers of
security technologies and services acting on behalf of those entities, pursuant to Article 6(1), point (f), of Regulation
(EU) 2016/679, including where such processing is necessary for cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements or
the voluntary notification of relevant information in accordance with this Directive. Measures related to the
prevention, detection, identification, containment, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness
in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and
coordinated vulnerability disclosure, the voluntary exchange of information about those incidents, and cyber
threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and
configuration tools could require the processing of certain categories of personal data, such as IP addresses, uniform
resources locators (URLs), domain names, email addresses and, where they reveal personal data, time stamps.
Processing of personal data by the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, could
constitute a legal obligation or be considered to be necessary for carrying out a task in the public interest or in the
exercise of official authority vested in the controller pursuant to Article 6(1), point (c) or (e), and Article 6(3) of
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or for pursuing a legitimate interest of the essential and important entities, as referred to
in Article 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation. Furthermore, national law could lay down rules allowing the competent
authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, to the extent that is necessary and proportionate for the
purpose of ensuring the security of network and information systems of essential and important entities, to process
special categories of personal data in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular by
providing for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of natural persons,
including technical limitations on the re-use of such data and the use of state-of-the-art security and privacypreserving measures, such as pseudonymisation, or encryption where anonymisation may significantly affect the
purpose pursued.
(122) In order to strengthen the supervisory powers and measures that help ensure effective compliance, this Directive
should provide for a minimum list of supervisory measures and means through which the competent authorities
can supervise essential and important entities. In addition, this Directive should establish a differentiation of
supervisory regime between essential and important entities with a view to ensuring a fair balance of obligations on
those entities and on the competent authorities. Therefore, essential entities should be subject to a comprehensive ex
ante and ex post supervisory regime, while important entities should be subject to a light, ex post only, supervisory
regime. Important entities should therefore not be required to systematically document compliance with
cybersecurity risk-management measures, while the competent authorities should implement a reactive ex post
approach to supervision and, hence, not have a general obligation to supervise those entities. The ex post
supervision of important entities may be triggered by evidence, indication or information brought to the attention
of the competent authorities considered by those authorities to suggest potential infringements of this Directive.
For example, such evidence, indication or information could be of the type provided to the competent authorities
by other authorities, entities, citizens, media or other sources or publicly available information, or could emerge
from other activities conducted by the competent authorities in the fulfilment of their tasks.
(123) The execution of supervisory tasks by the competent authorities should not unnecessarily hamper the business
activities of the entity concerned. Where the competent authorities execute their supervisory tasks in relation to
essential entities, including the conduct of on-site inspections and off-site supervision, the investigation of
infringements of this Directive and the conduct of security audits or security scans, they should minimise the
impact on the business activities of the entity concerned.
(124) In the exercise of ex ante supervision, the competent authorities should be able to decide on the prioritisation of the
use of supervisory measures and means at their disposal in a proportionate manner. This entails that the competent
authorities can decide on such prioritisation based on supervisory methodologies which should follow a risk-based
approach. More specifically, such methodologies could include criteria or benchmarks for the classification of
essential entities into risk categories and corresponding supervisory measures and means recommended per risk
category, such as the use, frequency or types of on-site inspections, targeted security audits or security scans, the
type of information to be requested and the level of detail of that information. Such supervisory methodologies
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