27.12.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 333/99
(98)
In order to safeguard the security of public electronic communications networks and publicly available electronic
communications services, the use of encryption technologies, in particular end-to-end encryption as well as datacentric security concepts, such as cartography, segmentation, tagging, access policy and access management, and
automated access decisions, should be promoted. Where necessary, the use of encryption, in particular end-to-end
encryption should be mandatory for providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly
available electronic communications services in accordance with the principles of security and privacy by default
and by design for the purposes of this Directive. The use of end-to-end encryption should be reconciled with the
Member States’ powers to ensure the protection of their essential security interests and public security, and to allow
for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences in accordance with Union law.
However, this should not weaken end-to-end encryption, which is a critical technology for the effective protection
of data and privacy and the security of communications.
(99)
In order to safeguard the security, and to prevent abuse and manipulation, of public electronic communications
networks and of publicly available electronic communications services, the use of secure routing standards should
be promoted to ensure the integrity and robustness of routing functions across the ecosystem of internet access
service providers.
(100) In order to safeguard the functionality and integrity of the internet and to promote the security and resilience of the
DNS, relevant stakeholders including Union private-sector entities, providers of publicly available electronic
communications services, in particular internet access service providers, and providers of online search engines
should be encouraged to adopt a DNS resolution diversification strategy. Furthermore, Member States should
encourage the development and use of a public and secure European DNS resolver service.
(101) This Directive lays down a multiple-stage approach to the reporting of significant incidents in order to strike the
right balance between, on the one hand, swift reporting that helps mitigate the potential spread of significant
incidents and allows essential and important entities to seek assistance, and, on the other, in-depth reporting that
draws valuable lessons from individual incidents and improves over time the cyber resilience of individual entities
and entire sectors. In that regard, this Directive should include the reporting of incidents that, based on an initial
assessment carried out by the entity concerned, could cause severe operational disruption of the services or
financial loss for that entity or affect other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material
damage. Such initial assessment should take into account, inter alia, the affected network and information systems,
in particular their importance in the provision of the entity’s services, the severity and technical characteristics of a
cyber threat and any underlying vulnerabilities that are being exploited as well as the entity’s experience with similar
incidents. Indicators such as the extent to which the functioning of the service is affected, the duration of an incident
or the number of affected recipients of services could play an important role in identifying whether the operational
disruption of the service is severe.
(102) Where essential or important entities become aware of a significant incident, they should be required to submit an
early warning without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours. That early warning should be followed by an
incident notification. The entities concerned should submit an incident notification without undue delay and in any
event within 72 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident, with the aim, in particular, of updating
information submitted through the early warning and indicating an initial assessment of the significant incident,
including its severity and impact, as well as indicators of compromise, where available. A final report should be
submitted not later than one month after the incident notification. The early warning should only include the
information necessary to make the CSIRT, or where applicable the competent authority, aware of the significant
incident and allow the entity concerned to seek assistance, if required. Such early warning, where applicable, should
indicate whether the significant incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and whether it is
likely to have a cross-border impact. Member States should ensure that the obligation to submit that early warning,
or the subsequent incident notification, does not divert the notifying entity’s resources from activities related to
incident handling that should be prioritised, in order to prevent incident reporting obligations from either diverting
resources from significant incident response handling or otherwise compromising the entity’s efforts in that respect.
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