A/76/136
freedom of expression. It is conceivable that in the future a number of these issues
will require further regulation at national or international level.At present, however,
the government believes that the existing range of human rights instrumentsprovides
sufficient scope for effectively safeguarding the protection of human rights in
cyberspace.
It is also clear that access to the internet is becoming increasingly important to the
effective exercise of human rights, not only for human rights defenders and NGOs
(which can use social media to drawattention to human rights violations and mobilise
support), but for everyone. Rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of
association and assembly have gained a new dimension with the adventof social media,
as have the right to education and the right to health, given the wealth of informationand
training courses available online. The right to privacy and the right to family life are
another example, thanks to the increased scope for digital communication. At the
same time the risk of violations of human rights online has also increased. There is
now more scope for surveillance, and disinformation has become more widespread.
The growing relevance of the internet to human rights underlines the need for a
secure, open andfree internet. The government is working at international level to
promote this aim.
Attribution
For a state to be held responsible under international law for a cyber operation
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and, by extension, for a target state to be able to take a countermeasure in response,
it must be possible to attribute the operation to the state in question. Any attribution
of cyber operations is always based on a government decision. Special attention is
paid to the degree to which the government has information of its own at its disposal
or to which it is able to reach an independent conclusion concerning information it
has obtained.
In the context of cyberspace, three forms of attribution can be distinguished:
- Technical attribution – a factual and technical investigation into the possible
perpetrators of a cyber operation and the degree of certainty with which their
identity can be established.
- Political attribution – a policy consideration whereby the decision is made to
attribute (publicly or otherwise) a specific cyber operation to an actor without
necessarily attaching legal consequences to the decision (such as taking
countermeasures). The attribution need not necessarily relate to a state; it may
also concern a private actor.
- Legal attribution – a decision whereby the victim state attributes an act or
omission to a specific state with the aim of holding that state legally responsible
for the violation of an obligation pursuant to international law.
In the case of legal attribution a distinction must be made between operations
carried out by or on behalf of a state and operations carried out by non-state actors.
An act by a government body in its official capacity (for example the National Cyber
Security Centre) is always attributable to the state. An act by a non-state actor is in
principle not attributable to a state. However, the situation changes if a state has
effective control over the act or accepts it as its own act after the fact. In such a case,
the non-state actor (or ‘proxy’) carries out the operation on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of that state. The threshold for establishing effective
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21-09670
For a discussion of countermeasures see page 62 of this appendix.
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