A/76/136
4.1
Attribution under international law
A State may be held responsible under international law for cyber operations
conducted by an organ of the State or by actors exercising governmental authority on
behalf of the State. 192
A State may be held responsible under international law for cyber operations
conducted by non-State actors if these are conducted on the direct instructions of the
State or under its direction or effective control. 193 It may be technically challenging
to establish that a relationship between a State and a non-State actor amounts to direct
instructions, direction or effective control. However, this is a question of evidence,
and not of lack of clarity of international law.
4.2
Due diligence
Furthermore, a State may be held responsible under international law if it knows
or should have known that cyber operations that target third States are being carried
out from or via its territory, and fails to take adequate measures. 194
As a consequence of the right to exercise sovereignty over cyber infrastructure
located on its territory, States also have a corresponding obligation not to knowingly
allow their territory to be used for acts causing significant harm to the rights of other
States under international law. This customary international law obligation, often
referred to as the due diligence principle, was recognised by the ICJ in the 1949 Corfu
Channel judgment, 195 and is reflected in numerous rules in specialised regimes of
international law. Norway is of the view that the due diligence obligation applies in
situations where there is a risk of transboundary harm from hazardous activities,
regardless of the nature of the activity, and accordingly also applies to cyber
operations.
Accordingly, if a State possesses knowledge of a cyber operation being carried
out from or via its territory causing serious adverse consequences with respect to a
right of the target State under international law, it is required to take adequate
measures to address the situation.
The due diligence standard is the conduct that is generally considered to be
appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm in the
particular instance. It is an obligation of conduct, not of result. Applied to cyber
activities, what is required is for the State to take all reasonably available measures
to terminate the cyber operation. A breach of the obligation consists not of failing to
achieve the desired result, but of failing to take the necessary, diligent steps towards
that end. It is irrelevant whether the cyber operation in question is conducted by a
third State or a non-State actor. Likewise, it is irrelevant whether the cyber operation
in question is conducted by an actor physically present on the State’s territory or by
an actor making remote use of ICT infrastructure on the State’s territory.
In addition to actual knowledge of the use of cyber infrastructure within its
territory for harmful cyber operations against another State, a State may also violate
its due diligence obligation if it is in fact unaware of the activities in question but
objectively should have known about them and fails to address the situation. 196
Accordingly, knowledge also encompasses those situations in which a State in the
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192
193
194
195
196
21-09670
Cf. ILC ASR, in particular Articles 4, 5 and 7.
See Article 8 ILC ASR. See also Nicaragua judgment, para 115, and Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ, judgment 27 February 2007, para. 400.
See Article 2 ILC ASR, which explicitly states that a State’s conduct may consist of ‘an action or
omission’. See also Corfu Channel, ICJ, judgment 9 April 1949, p. 18.
Corfu Channel judgment, 9 April 1949, p. 22
Corfu Channel judgment, 9 April 1949, p. 18.
71/142
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