The identification of emanation security controls that need to be implemented for a system at an early stage in the project lifecycle. This can significantly affect project costs. Costs are invariably greater where changes are necessary once the system had been designed or has been implemented. 10.7.8.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:2463] Agencies SHOULD conduct an emanation security threat assessment as early as possible in project lifecycles. 10.7.9. IT equipment in SECURE areas 10.7.9.R.01. Rationale All equipment must conform to applicable industry and government standards, including NZCSI 420; Laboratory Tempest Test Standard for Equipment in Controlled Environments. Not all equipment within a secure facility in New Zealand requires testing against TEMPEST standards. 10.7.9.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): Confidential, Secret, Top Secret; Compliance: MUST [CID:2465] Agencies MUST ensure that IT equipment within secure areas meet industry and government standards relating to electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility. 10.8. Network Design, Architecture and IP Address Management Objective 10.8.1. IP Address architecture, allocation and addressing schemes enable and support system security and data protection. Context Scope 10.8.2. This section includes discussion of the principles of separation and segregation as network design and network architecture characteristics. It also discusses how IP addresses can be used to support these principles for improved security of larger or multi-classification agency systems. Background 10.8.3. The larger the network, the more difficult it is to protect. A large, unsegmented network presents a large attack surface with greater susceptibility to the rapid spread and dissemination of system faults, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and attacks. In a non-segmented network, traffic and applications generally have access to the entire network. If a fault occurs or an attacker gains entry, the fault or attacker can move laterally through the network causing disruption, network outages and enabling access to critical operational or classified data. 10.8.4. A large network is also more difficult to monitor and control. Segmenting the network limits an attacker’s ability to move through the network by preventing lateral movement between zones. Segmentation also enhances the ability to detect, monitor, control, isolate and correct faults. 10.8.5. A fundamental construct in the management of risk in networks is that of Trust Zones and Trust Boundaries. A Trust Zone is a zoning construct based on levels of trust, classification, information asset value and essential information security. A Trust Boundary is the interface between two or more Trust Zones. Trust Zones use the principles of separation and segregation to manage sensitive information assets and ensure security policies are consistently applied to all assets in a particular Trust Zone. Refer also to Section 22.1 – Cloud Computing and Section 22.2 – Virtualisation. Separation and Segregation 10.8.6. Separation and Segregation are determined by system function and the sensitivity of the data the system stores, processes and transmits. One common example is placing systems that require a connection to the Internet into a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that is separated and segregated (isolated) from more sensitive systems. Another example is the use of compartments. 10.8.7. Separation and Segregation limits the ability of an intruder to exploit a vulnerability with the intent of elevating privileges to gain access to more sensitive systems on the internal network. VLANs may be used to further separate systems by controlling access and providing segregation thus giving additional protection. 10.8.8. Network segmentation is an effective strategy for protecting access to key data assets, and impeding the lateral movement of system faults, threats and malicious activity. Segregation has the following benefits: Enhanced performance: with fewer hosts per subnet, there is a reduced signalling and traffic overhead allowing more bandwidth for data communication. Improved security: with less signalling traffic going through all network segments, it is more difficult for an attacker to analyse the addressing scheme and network structure. Failures in one segment are less likely to propagate and more robust access control can be established and enforced. 10.8.9. Effective segregation also requires: Specialised knowledge: networks may support many devices with complex policies and rule sets. Support staff must be properly educated and trained to ensure the network segmentation is maintained. Administrative effort: changes in infrastructure, such as new applications and new technologies, can extend the time required to make changes and ensure the integrity of network segments. Infrastructure Investment: segregation may require more equipment, new equipment with advanced functionalities, or specific software to deal with multiple segments. These requirements should be considered during budget planning. ISO 27001 and ISO 27002 implementation recommendations for network segregation 10.8.10. These ISO Standards require the implementation of network segregation. In particular they recommend that groups of information services, users, and information systems are segregated on networks. Specific recommendations are summarised below: Divide large networks into separate network domains (segments); Consider physical and logical segregation; Define domain perimeters; Define traffic rules between domains; 114 Version_3.5__January-2022

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