Reference
Title
Getting Ready for Post-Quantum
Cryptography
Publisher
Source
NIST
National Institute for Standards and
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04282021.pdf
Technology
Post-Quantum
Cryptography Project (NIST)
NIST
National Institute for Standards and
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/postquantum-cryptography
Technology
Post-Quantum Cryptography
Migration To Post-Quantum
Department of Homeland Security
(US DHS)
National Cybersecurity Center of
Cryptography
Excellence (US NCCoE)
https://www.dhs.gov/quantum
https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/
default/files/library/projectdescriptions/pqc-migration-projectdescription-final.pdf
Rationale & Controls
2.4.13.
Post-Quantum Cryptography Preparation
2.4.13.R.01.
Rationale
International organisations are in the process of developing standards for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. The standards will be
reviewed and incorporated into the NZISM as they are published.
2.4.13.R.02.
Rationale
As standards are still under development the form of post-quantum cryptography is not fully determined at this point in time.
2.4.13.R.03.
Rationale
It is recognised that providing guidance on the concrete and achievable steps that can be taken now to prepare for the transition to postquantum cryptography will help ensure a smooth and efficient transition to any new standards that become available.
2.4.13.C.01.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7206]
Agencies SHOULD ensure they are aware of the latest developments in post-quantum cryptography. GCSB is tracking these developments and
will continue to provide advice through the NZISM.
2.4.13.C.02.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7207]
Agencies SHOULD maintain an inventory of sensitive and criticaldatasets that must be secured for an extended amount of time. This will
ensure datasets that may be at risk now and decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is available are not secured solely
through the use of quantum vulnerable cryptography.
2.4.13.C.03.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7208]
Agencies SHOULD conduct an inventory of systems using cryptographic technologies to determine the potential size and scope of future
transition work once post-quantum cryptographic systems become available.
2.4.13.C.04.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7209]
Agencies SHOULD identify which systems in their inventory rely on public key cryptography and note them as quantum vulnerable in agency
risk assessments.
2.4.13.C.05.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7210]
Agencies SHOULD determine a priority order for quantum vulnerable systems to be transitioned from classical cryptography to post-quantum
cryptography.
2.4.13.C.06.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7211]
Agencies SHOULD consider the following factors when prioritising the quantum vulnerable systems:
Is the system a high value asset based on agency requirements?
Does the system protect sensitive information (e.g. key stores, passwords, root keys, signing keys, personally identifiable information, and
classified information)?
Do other systems (internal or external to the agency) depend on the cryptographic protections in place on the quantum vulnerable
system?
How long does the data need to be protected?
2.4.13.C.07.
ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:7212]
Using the inventory and prioritisation information, agencies SHOULD develop a plan for system transitions upon publication of the new postquantum cryptographic standard.
3. Information security governance - roles and responsibilities
3.1. The Agency Head
19
Version_3.5__January-2022
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents