ISO/IEC TR 29123:2007
Identification Cards – Proximity
ISO
http://www.iso.org
Cards – Requirements for the
enhancement of interoperability
Legislation and Regulation
11.6.58. Further references onLegislation and Regulation can be found at:
References
SR 2001/240
Title
Publisher
Source
Radiocommunications Act 1989
Parliamentary Counsel Office
http://www.legislation.govt.nz
Radiocommunications
Parliamentary Counsel Office
http://www.legislation.govt.nz
Radiocommunications
New Zealand Gazette Office,
https://gazette.govt.nz/notice/id/201
Regulations (Prohibited
Equipment - Radio Jammer
Government Information Services,
Department of Internal Affairs
1-go4051
Ministry of Business, Innovation and
http://www.rsm.govt.nz/
Regulations 2001, Reprint as at
1 February 2015
Equipment) Notice 2011
Radio Spectrum Management
Employment
Rationale & Controls
11.6.59. Risk Assessment
11.6.59.R.01. Rationale
As with many technologies, adoption of RFID has the potential to introduce a wide range of risks in addition to the risks that already exist for
agency systems. This may include privacy risks, depending on the use, information held and implementation of the RFID system. A risk
assessment is an essential tool in determining and assessing the range and extent of risk and threat in the use of RFID devices.
11.6.59.R.02. Rationale
Risks to RFID system vary according to the technology used, system engineering, the systems architecture, application, context and
deployment scenario. A holistic approach to risk at each stage of the system life cycle and each for system component is essential if a robust
security strategy is to be developed.
11.6.59.R.03. Rationale
The identification of classes of tags is fundamental to managing the risks of RFID devices in secure spaces. Classes 0 and 1 pose little risk.
Other classes of tag (2 to 5), however, have limited data storage capability and active tags include transmitter functionality which introduces
higher levels of risk. RFID readers are, by definition, transmitters and are not permitted in secure spaces.
11.6.59.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:2956]
Agencies MUST conduct and document a risk assessment before implementing or adopting an RFID solution.
11.6.59.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:2957]
This risk assessment MUST be the basis of a security architecture design.
11.6.60. Security Architecture
11.6.60.R.01. Rationale
The foundation of strong security architecture in RFID follows three important principles:
Controlled access to the data – only authorised entities (people, systems, devices) can read and write information to and from the RFID
tags (EPC number, tag identifier, kill password, access password and user memory) and RFID databases;
Control over access to the system – only authorised entities can configure or add devices to the system, and all devices on the system
are authentic and trustworthy;
Confidence and trust – back-end systems are designed and implemented in accordance with the current version of the NZISM.
11.6.60.R.02. Rationale
Sensitive data should be held in a secure RFID Enterprise Subsystem and retrieved using the tag’s unique identifier with only an identifier
stored on the tag itself. The Enterprise RFID subsystem should be established as a separate domain where data can be more adequately
protected. This structure makes it more difficult for adversaries to obtain information from the tag through scanning or eavesdropping. Data
encryption and access control is often more cost-effectively performed in the enterprise subsystem than in the RF subsystem.
11.6.60.R.03. Rationale
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